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PUTTING THE “PUBLIC” BACK IN “PUBLIC USE” 
INTERPRETING THE 2011 LEAHY-SMITH 
AMERICA INVENTS ACT 
Joseph A. Lingenfelter* 
INTRODUCTION 
Eolas1 Technologies (Eolas) approaches you, a potential investor, 
and explains that Michael Doyle and his University of California San 
Francisco team invented the first web browser that supports plug-
ins.2 After the investment pitch, you realize the importance of the 
invention. You perform due diligence on the claimed invention and 
the patent looks legitimate. After some back and forth with the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and some 
amended claim language, Eolas secures a patent on this monumental 
innovation to website development.3 You decide, “I’m in.” 
Several years later, after a jury awards Eolas $520 million in 
damages against corporate giant Microsoft Corporation, three judges 
decide that a conversation Pei-Yuan Wei had with two engineers at 
Sun Microsystems can invalidate the patent.4 “Who is Wei?” you 
might wonder. Wei invented a similar software design that supported 
                                                                                                                 
* J.D., Boston University School of Law, 2014; B.S. Aerospace Engineering, Boston University College 
of Engineering, 2011. Special thanks to the Boston University School of Law, to Professor Michael 
Meurer for his wise counsel in the research and preparation of this article, and to the Georgia State 
University Law Review for preparing this article for publication. I would also like to thank my wife, 
Theresa, for her continuous support. 
 1. Irish for “knowledge.” Products, EOLAS, http://eolas.com/technologies.html (last visited Oct. 14, 
2014). The acronym stands for “Embedded Objects Linked Across Systems.” Id. 
 2. Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005). A plug-in is a 
software component that embeds a particular feature within an existing software application. See Check 
Your Plugins, MOZILLA, https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/plugincheck/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2014). Plug-
ins allow users to customize a software application. Id. Some well-known plug-ins are Adobe Flash, 
QuickTime, and Java. Id. 
 3. See Eric Bangerman, Microsoft, Eolas May Close the Books on Browser Plug-in Patent Fight, 
ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 2, 2007 11:32 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2007/08/microsoft-eolas-
may-close-the-books-on-browser-plug-in-patent-fight/. 
 4. Eolas Techs., Inc., 399 F.3d at 1332–33. 
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plug-ins.5 No, Wei did not file for a patent.6 No, Wei did not share 
his invention with the world.7 All Wei did was show two engineers 
that he developed a browser that supported plug-ins.8 And there goes 
your investment.9 The patent is invalid, and Eolas cannot exclude 
others from using its revolutionary web-browsing tool.10 
The goal of the patent system, as defined by America’s founding 
fathers, is “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”11 The right to 
exclude others from making, using, and selling the patented 
technology in the United States, granted by 35 U.S.C. § 154, creates 
a limited monopoly, which in turn provides a financial incentive to 
the inventor or assignee of the patent rights.12 The promise of this 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See John Ribeiro, Patent Firm Eolas Loses Appeal in Web Patents Lawsuit, COMPUTERWORLD 
(July 23, 2013, 3:12 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2484193/technology-law-
regulation/patent-firm-eolas-loses-appeal-in-web-patents-lawsuit.html (noting Wei created a program 
called “Viola”). 
 6. Cf. Eolas Techs., Inc., 399 F.3d at 1329 (noting that Wei invented the Viola web browser, 
demonstrated it to two engineers at Sun Microsystems, and later made a new version of Viola). 
 7. See id. at 1329–30. Wei did publish a paper on the Internet describing his invention, at least by 
Aug. 1994. Id. at 1330. However, this publication was well within the one-year grace period provided 
by the Patent Act prior to 2013. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). Diligent inventors and investors know 
that such a publication cannot erect a bar to patentability. See id. (denying patent protection to claimed 
inventions in a printed publication or in public use more than one year prior to the effective application 
date of the patent). 
 8. See Joe Mullin, The Web’s Longest Nightmare Ends: Eolas’ Patents are Dead on Appeal, ARS 
TECHNICA (July 22, 2013 10:41 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/07/the-webs-longest-
nightmare-ends-eolas-patents-are-dead-on-appeal/ (explaining that Wei demonstrated his software 
programs to engineers at Sun Microsystems). 
 9. After the Federal Circuit overturned the $565 million judgment in the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Eloas settled with Microsoft for $100 million dollars. Id. Had Microsoft 
refused the settlement, it is likely that that Eolas would have walked away with an invalid patent and 
millions of dollars in litigation costs. Indeed, when Eolas sued Adobe Systems Inc., Amazon.com Inc., 
CDW Corp., Citigroup Inc., The Go Daddy Group, Inc., Google Inc., J.C. Penney Corp., Inc., Staples, 
Inc., Yahoo! Inc., and Youtube, LLC, in the Eastern District of Texas, the Federal Circuit upheld a jury 
verdict that Eolas’s patent lacked novelty due to Wei’s public use and was invalid. Eolas Techs. Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 521 F. App’x 928 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished). 
 10. See Ribeiro, supra note 5. 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Edward C. Walterscheid, Priority of Invention: How the United 
States Came to Have a “First-to-Invent” Patent System, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 263, 280–81 (1995). 
 12. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (citing Bonito Boats, 
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)). 
[T]he patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the 
creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for 
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reward is often essential to the development of technology in the first 
place. 13  Accordingly, without confidence in the patent system’s 
promise to reward, many inventors would not invent and many 
investors would not finance developments in “Science and useful 
Arts.”14 In the Eolas example,15 the one hundred investors would not 
have purchased stock in the company if they did not believe there 
was a substantial likelihood that they would be financially rewarded. 
In the last twenty years, at least twenty-four other cases before the 
Federal Circuit involved alleged third party “public use.”16 At least 
eight of these patents were invalidated by hidden, inaccessible, third 
party use.17 Many more cases involving alleged third party public use 
occurred in the federal district courts throughout the United States.18 
Examples like Eolas stifle innovation because they make it difficult 
to predict whether a patent satisfies the novelty requirement and 
make investing in technology too risky.19 
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA), which took 
effect on March 16, 2013, poses a serious threat to the efficacy of the 
U.S. patent system.20 The AIA converted the patent system from a 
first-to-invent into a first-inventor-to-file system,21 harmonizing the 
American system with the rest of the world. Accompanying this 
major transition, the AIA removed the automatic, one-year grace 
                                                                                                                 
an exclusive monopoly The balance between the interest in motivating innovation and 
enlightenment by rewarding invention with patent protection on the one hand, and the 
interest in avoiding monopolies that unnecessarily stifle competition on the other, has 
been a feature of the federal patent laws since their inception. 
Id. 
 13. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 
265, 266 (1977) (arguing that no one will invest the time and money into an invention without the 
possibility of future returns). 
 14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 15. See supra text accompanying notes 1–9. 
 16. See infra note 178. 
 17. See infra note 179. 
 18. E.g., MRC Innovations, Inc. v. Hunter MFG, LLP, 921 F. Supp. 2d 800, 805 (N.D. Ohio 2013); 
Seed Research Equip. Solutions v. Gary W. Clem, Inc., No. 09-0282-EFM-KGG, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 181381, at *12–13 (D. Kan. 2012); Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. First Quality Baby 
Prods., L.L.C., No. 09-C-0916, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167945, at *20 (E.D. Wis. 2012). 
 19. See supra text accompanying notes 4–14. 
 20. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.112-29, § 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 293 (2011). 
 21. Id. 
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period for third party public use events and removed the “in this 
country” limitation on the public use statutory bar.22 These changes 
dramatically increase the scope of activity that may erect the public 
use statutory bar.23 For example, to invalidate the Eolas patent, Wei’s 
conversation with his colleagues must have occurred in the United 
States and more than one year before Doyle filed the patent 
application. 24  After the enactment of the AIA, that conversation 
could have taken place anywhere in the world and just moments 
before Doyle filed the patent application. Although the problem of 
hidden, inaccessible, private third party public use has not noticeably 
suppressed innovation in the past, 25  the new breadth of the AIA 
public use category threatens to do so in the future because nearly 
secret uses of technology, occurring anywhere in the world, will 
invalidate dramatically more patents. Thus, retaining the old 
definition of public use may be “fairly disastrous for the U.S. patent 
system.”26 
Part I of this paper discusses the development of the § 102(b) 
public use statutory bar and reveals that the pre-AIA interpretation of 
“public use . . . includes any public use of the claimed invention by a 
person other than the inventor who is under no limitation, restriction, 
or obligation of secrecy to the inventor.”27  Under that definition, 
hidden, inaccessible, private third party uses of the patented 
technology constitute patent-invalidating prior art under the public 
use statutory bar. Part II argues that the plain language and the 
legislative history of the AIA support a narrower interpretation of the 
term public use. Moreover, Part II advocates that employing the pre-
AIA definition of public use will make it impossible to predict 
whether a patent issued by the USPTO satisfies the novelty 
requirement because a third party may have nearly secretly used the 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012), with 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 23. See infra Part II. 
 24. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text; 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 25. See supra text accompanying notes 16–18. 
 26. 157 CONG. REC. S34, 1371 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl). 
 27. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 655 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(internal quotation omitted). 
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patented-technology anywhere in the world.28 To increase notice and 
predictability in the patent system, public use under the AIA should 
exclude these hidden, inaccessible, private actions by third-parties. 
Part III discusses issues raised by such an interpretation: should the 
same definition of public use apply when dealing with first party 
nearly secret uses?29 Should an inventor’s own secret commercial 
exploitation of his invention forfeit his or her right to patent the 
invention? Should the “on sale” bar under the AIA exclude hidden, 
inaccessible, private sales of an invention by a third party? If the term 
public use excludes these nearly secret uses, how should courts 
define public use under the AIA? 
I.   THE PUBLIC USE STATUTORY BAR 
A.   Novelty, Statutory Bars, and Nonobviousness 
To receive patent protection—the right to exclude others from 
making, using, selling, and offering to sell the patented technology—
the invention must satisfy the five basic conditions of patentability: 
the invention must be (1) patentable subject matter,30 (2) useful,31 (3) 
new, 32  (4) nonobvious, 33  and (5) the patent application must 
                                                                                                                 
 28. See discussion infra Part II. 
 29. See discussion infra Part III. 
 30. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (requiring that an invention be a “new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof”). Although the 
category of patentable subject matter is very broad, the three specific unpatentable subject matters are 
laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010). 
 31. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o 
promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts”) (emphasis added). Patents are unavailable for 
abstract discoveries or inventions which may be useful. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528–29, 536 
(1966) (“[A] patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its 
successful conclusion.”). 
 32. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); see infra text accompanying notes 35–41. 
 33. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012): 
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the 
claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would 
have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. 
Id. In making the § 103 nonobviousness determination, courts determine the following, as of the date of 
the invention: (1) the scope and content of the prior art at the time of the invention; (2) the differences 
between the prior art and the claims at issue; and (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. 
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adequately disclose the invention.34 To satisfy the third requirement 
(the novelty requirement), the claimed invention must be new relative 
to the activity of others prior to the critical date.35 Before Congress 
enacted the AIA, the Patent Act provided that a person is not entitled 
to a patent if: 
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or 
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign 
country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, 
or 
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed 
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale 
in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the 
application for patent in the United States . . . .36 
The pre-AIA § 102(b) requirements are referred to as statutory 
bars and the pre-AIA § 102(a) requirements embody the priority 
right—the first person to invent something new has the exclusive 
right to patent his invention.37 
When an invention is in public use in the United States or 
described in a printed publication anywhere in the world more than a 
                                                                                                                 
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). Secondary considerations such as 
“commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light 
to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.” Id. at 17–18. 
 34. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same . . . .”). This is referred to as the “enablement requirement”: 
The term “undue experimentation” does not appear in the statute, but it is well 
established that enablement requires that the specification teach those in the art to make 
and use the invention without undue experimentation . . . . Factors to be considered in 
determining whether a disclosure would require undue experimentation . . . [i]nclude (1) 
the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance 
presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the 
invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the 
predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims. 
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). In addition, “[e]very patent must 
describe an invention.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(holding this is “a separate requirement”). 
 35. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 36. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 37. Id. However, if the first person to invent abandons, suppresses, or conceals his invention, a 
subsequent inventor can patent the invention. Id. § 102(g). 
6
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss4/5
2015] PUTTING THE “PUBLIC” BACK IN “PUBLIC USE”  873 
year before the inventor files his patent application, the claimed 
invention is anticipated.38 The public use event or printed publication 
description is referred to as a prior art reference.39 For a prior art 
reference to anticipate an invention, it must satisfy the all elements 
rule.40 The all elements rule requires that a single prior art reference 
includes each element of the claimed invention41 and courts strictly 
apply this rule. 
If a prior art reference does not satisfy the all elements rule (i.e. it 
is missing one or more of the limitations in the claimed invention) the 
patentee may still not be entitled to a patent because, in addition to 
being novel, the invention must be nonobvious. The nonobviousness 
requirement provides that a claimed invention is not patentable if the 
differences between the new invention and the prior art reference 
would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the 
art. 42  In some circumstances, a patent examiner or a court can 
combine different prior art references to render the claimed invention 
obvious.43 
B.   Patent Policies Underlying the Public Use Statutory Bar 
Four patent law policies justify application of the public use 
statutory bar: quid pro quo, channeling, prompt disclosure, and 
detrimental public reliance.44 The quid pro quo rationale advocates 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id. § 102(a)-(b) (2006). 
 39. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012). Prior art is not limited to public use events or descriptions in 
printed publications. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). The term of art includes any event or reference 
specified in § 102(b) that may bar an application or invalidate a patent granted by the USPTO. Id. In 
addition to public use and printed publications, prior art includes “on sale” activity in the United States 
more than one year before the application for the patent. Id. 
 40. E.g., Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the 
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a 
whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.”). 
 43. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 425 (2007) (combining a prior art 
reference teaching the usefulness of placing a sensor on a car’s pedal device with another reference 
teaching how to solve a wire-chaffing problem related to placing the sensor in that location). 
 44. Tone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“We have enumerated the 
policies underlying section 102(b) . . . as follows: (1) discouraging the removal, from the public domain, 
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on behalf of the general public, demanding that society receive a 
benefit in exchange for the benefits granted to the inventor.45 The 
patentee reaps the exclusive right to make, use, sell and offer to sell 
the claimed invention.46 In return for this limited monopoly right, 
society profits from the use of the new invention (made and sold by 
the patent holder) and from future improvements made to the 
invention. 47  Society also receives the benefit of unrestricted 
manufacture and use of the patented technology after the patent term 
expires. 48  The public use statutory bar ensures that the patented 
innovation was not already publicly used.49 This rationale presumes 
that if an invention is in public use, society already has these 
benefits.50 
                                                                                                                 
of inventions that the public reasonably has come to believe are freely available; (2) favoring the prompt 
and widespread disclosure of inventions . . . and (4) prohibiting the inventor from commercially 
exploiting the invention for a period greater than the statutorily prescribed time.”). The one-year, built-
in grace period balances these policies with the policy of allowing an inventor time to perfect his 
invention and prepare a patent application. See id. (“[One of] the policies underlying section 102(b) 
[is] . . . allowing the inventor a reasonable amount of time following sales activity to determine the 
potential economic value of a patent.”). These important policies underlie not only the public use 
statutory bar but also the “on sale” statutory bar and other aspects of the novelty and nonobviousness 
requirements. See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64–66 (1998) (discussing patent policies 
of § 102 as a whole and applying the § 102(b) “on sale” bar to further those policies). 
 45. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 23 (1829) (“If the public were already in possession and 
common use of an invention . . . there might be sound reason for presuming, that the legislature did not 
intend to grant an exclusive right to any one [sic],” given the absence of a “quid pro quo.”); J.E.M. Ag 
Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 
416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)) (“The disclosure [of a new invention] required by the patent act is ‘the quid 
pro quo of the right to exclude.’”); supra note 12. 
 46. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012). “[T]he Patent Act also declares that ‘patents shall have the 
attributes of personal property,’ § 261, including ‘the right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention,’ § 154(a)(1).” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 
388, 392 (2006). 
 47. Cf. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 142 (quoting Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484) (“The disclosure [of a new 
invention] required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.’”). Although the 
inventor has the exclusive right to “use” the invention, the purchase of a patented device includes an 
implied right to “use” the invention embodied in the device. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 
241, 249 (1942). 
 48. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (quoting United States 
v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186–87 (1933)) (“[U]pon expiration of that period, the 
knowledge of the invention inures to the people, who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it 
and profit by its use.”). 
 49. Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 
518 (2009). 
 50. See id. This assumption is not always true. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484 n.13 (“An invention may 
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Second, the channeling rationale forces inventors to choose either 
secrecy (i.e. trade secret protection) or disclosure (i.e. patent 
protection).51 This prevents inventors from effectively extending the 
duration of the statutorily granted monopoly right and increases the 
rate at which technology develops.52 Without the public use bar, an 
inventor or others could use the invention in public for many years 
and then, as soon as competition arrives, apply for patent protection. 
This practice extends the effective length of the patent term because 
the patent term ends years later than it would have ended had the 
inventor applied for the patent as soon as the invention was 
completed. 
The third rationale underlying the public use statutory bar is to 
encourage prompt disclosure of new technology. 53  Through early 
disclosure of new technology, persons skilled in the same field access 
and learn the new technology sooner, which allows researchers and 
inventors in that field of art to improve their work and innovate 
faster. 54  The rate of innovation increases notwithstanding the 
inventor’s exclusive right to make and use the invention because 
                                                                                                                 
be placed ‘in public use or on sale’ within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b) without losing its secret 
character.” (citing Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 224 n.6 (2d Cir. 1971))); Metallizing 
Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946)); see also Roin, supra 
note 49, at 517. 
 51. Metallizing, 153 F.2d at 520 (“[The inventor] must content himself with either secrecy, or [a 
patent].”). 
 52. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829) (“If an inventor should be permitted to hold back 
from the knowledge of the public the secrets of his invention; if he should, for a long period of years, 
retain the monopoly, and make and sell his invention publicly; and thus gather the whole profits of it, 
relying upon his superior skill and knowledge of the structure; and then, and then only, when the danger 
of competition should force him to procure the exclusive right, . . . it would materially retard the 
progress of science and the useful arts; and give a premium to those who should be least prompt to 
communicate their discoveries.”). See also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998) 
(“[Section] 102 . . . serves as a limiting provision, . . . confining the duration of the monopoly to the 
statutory term.” (citing Frantz Mfg. Co. v. Phenix Mfg. Co., 457 F.2d 314, 320 (7th Cir. 1972))); 
Metallizing, 153 F. 2d at 520. 
 53. Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Section 
102(b) . . . is primarily concerned with the policy that encourages an inventor to enter the patent system 
promptly, while recognizing a one year period of public knowledge or use or commercial exploitation 
before the patent application must be filed.”). The written description component of the patent 
application discloses the invention and new information underlying the claimed invention to society. See 
supra note 34. 
 54. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 496–97 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
9
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other inventors can utilize the information contained in the patent 
application to improve the invention or develop related products or 
processes. 55  The rate of innovation also increases because other 
inventors can practice the patented invention with the patent holder’s 
permission.56 In addition, prompt disclosure of the claimed invention 
allows general society to use the invention sooner because the patent 
term expires sooner.57 
Lastly, the public use statutory bar reflects a concern about 
detrimental public reliance on a claimed invention.58 Section 102(b) 
prevents an inventor from inducing the public to rely on a new 
technology and then later obtain a patent on the new technology.59 
Once the patent issues, the invention’s widespread use gives the 
limited monopoly on the new technology greater market strength and 
allows the inventor to charge higher prices for the patented goods or 
services.60 Thus, the public use bar protects society and businesses 
from a business-savvy inventor. 
The germinal public use case Pennock v. Dialogue exemplifies 
several policies underlying the statutory bar.61 In 1811, Pennock and 
Sellers completed an invention consisting of an “improvement in the 
art of making leather tubes or hose, for conveying air, water, and 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See id. 
 56. See Daniel Taskalos, Note, Metallizing Engineering’s Forfeiture Doctrine After the America 
Invents Act, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 657, 669 (2013). 
 57. See Pennock, 27 U.S. at 19 (“[T]he main object was ‘to promote the progress of science and 
useful arts;’ and this could be done best, by giving the public at large a right to make, construct, use, and 
vend the thing invented, at as early a period as possible.”). 
 58. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2012). 
 59. Nat’l Research Dev. Corp. v. Varian Assocs., No. 93-1421, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 1493 at *12 
(Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 1994) (“This result furthers the important public policy of discouraging the removal 
of inventions from the public domain which members of the public justifiably have come to believe are 
freely available.”); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998) (citing Frantz Mfg. Co. v. Phenix 
Mfg. Co., 457 F.2d 314, 320 (7th Cir. 1972)) (“[Section] 102 . . . serves as a limiting 
provision, . . . excluding ideas that are in the public domain from patent protection . . . .”) 
(“A . . . reluctance to allow an inventor to remove existing knowledge from public use undergirds the 
[public use] bar.” (citing Pennock, 27 U.S. at 24)); cf. Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 
1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The ‘printed publication’ provision of § 102(b) ‘was designed to prevent 
withdrawal by an inventor . . . of that which was already in the possession of the public.’” (quoting In re 
Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (C.C.P.A. 1981))). 
 60. See Roin, supra note 49, at 508. 
 61. See generally Pennock, 27 U.S. 1. 
10
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss4/5
2015] PUTTING THE “PUBLIC” BACK IN “PUBLIC USE”  877 
other fluids.”62 Not until 1818 did they apply for and obtain a patent 
on the invention.63 Between 1811 and 1818, Pennock and Sellers 
gave a third party permission to make and sell upwards of 13,000 feet 
of hose constructed according to the claimed invention. 64  The 
Supreme Court found the patent invalid because the invention was in 
the public’s possession and in common use when Pennock and 
Sellers applied for the patent.65 
The Court noted that, by waiting approximately seven years before 
filing for their patent, Pennock and Sellers had delayed the time in 
which members of society could freely make, use, and sell the 
invention.66 According to the Court, filing immediately for a patent 
(prompt disclosure) was the best way “to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts.” 67  In addition, the Court adopted the 
channeling rationale when it explained that “it would materially 
retard the progress of science and the useful arts” if courts permitted 
an inventor to keep his invention a secret for many years and only 
apply for a patent once competition appeared.68 Finally, the Court 
explained that once an inventor puts an invention into public use, he 
cannot later remove that knowledge from the public. 69  Thus, the 
Court protected members of the public who had come to rely on 
unrestricted use of that knowledge.70 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id. at 14. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 3. 
 65. Id. at 14–15, 23. The Court relied on Section 1 of the Patent Act of 1793, which granted “letters 
patent” “when any person or persons . . . invented any new or useful art, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement [thereon], not known or used before the 
application.” Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318. The Court interpreted this statute to mean 
that the claimed invention must be “not known or used by the public, before the [patent] application.” 
Pennock, 27 U.S. at 19. 
 66. Pennock, 27 U.S. at 19. 
 67. Id. at 16 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). 
 68. Id. at 19. 
 69. Id. at 24 (“His voluntary act or acquiescence in the public sale and use is an abandonment of his 
right . . . .”); see Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998) (explaining that Pennock prohibits an 
inventor from “remov[ing] existing knowledge from public use.”). 
 70. See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 65 (“The patent laws . . . [seek] to protect the public’s right to retain 
knowledge already in the public domain . . . .”). 
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C.   Defining Public Use Before the AIA 
Congress explicitly incorporated the public use restriction into the 
patent statutes in 1836.71 Over time, courts have interpreted the term 
“public use” extremely broadly, straining the term’s plain meaning. 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained that “public 
use includes any use of the claimed invention by a person other than 
the inventor who is under no limitation, restriction or obligation of 
secrecy to the inventor.” 72  Similarly, patent law scholar Donald 
Chisum defines the term to include “use of the product or process ‘in 
its natural and intended way’—even if the invention may in fact be 
hidden from public view with such use.”73 
First addressing the “known or used” statutory bar in Pennock, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the knowledge or use must be by persons 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117; 2-6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS 
§ 6.02(1)(b) (2014). Section 1 of the Patent Act of 1793 required that an invention for which a patent 
was sought be “not known or used before the application.” Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318. 
See generally Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 518 (2d Cir. 
1946) (describing the development of the public use statutory bar); Michael F. Martin, The End of the 
First-to-Invent Rule: A Concise History of its Origin, 49 IDEA 435 (2009) (describing the enactment of 
the 1790 patent act and the development of the first-to-invent rule of priority). Interpreting this statute in 
Pennock, the Supreme Court ruled that “known or used” must mean known or used by persons other 
than the inventor and his employees, including such knowledge or use as would result from commercial 
exploitation. Pennock, 27 U.S. at 19; see 2-6 CHISUM, supra at § 6.02(1)(a). 
In 1897, Congress enacted the long-standing pre-AIA form of the statutory bar. Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 
391, § 1, 29 Stat. 692 (granting a patent to any person who invented a new and useful product or process 
“not patented or described in any printed publication in this or any foreign country, before his invention 
or discovery thereof, or more than two years prior to his application, and not in public use or on sale in 
this country for more than two years prior to his application”); 2-6 CHISUM, supra note 71, at § 6.02(1). 
In 1939, Congress amended the statutory bar provision by shortening the period from two years to one 
year. Act of Aug. 5, 1939 ch. 450, § 1, 53 Stat. 1212; 2-6 CHISUM, supra note 71, at §6.02(1)(d). As of 
March 15, 2013, before the final provisions of the AIA took effect, the patent laws required that an 
invention not be “known or used by others” before the date of invention, and not be “in public use” 
more than one year before the application date. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); see supra note 36 and 
accompanying text. 
 72. Dey, L.P. v. Sunovion Pharms., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Netscape 
Commc’ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (alterations and internal quotation 
marks omitted) (emphasis in original)). This definition applies regardless of whether the patent-
defeating use is with or without the first inventor’s consent. See, e.g., Elec. Storage Battery Co. v. 
Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 17–20 (1939) (applying § 102(b) public use bar when a third party company 
independently invented and practiced the patented technology in its factory without placing its 
employees under a confidentiality agreement). 
 73. 2-6 CHISUM, supra note 71, at § 6.02(5)(a) & n.146. 
12
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss4/5
2015] PUTTING THE “PUBLIC” BACK IN “PUBLIC USE”  879 
other than the inventor and his employees.74 A half-century later in 
Consolidated Fruit Jar Co. v. Wright, 75  addressing what sort of 
conduct may forge the bar to patentability, the Court stated, “a single 
instance . . . of use by the patentee may, under the circumstances, be 
fatal to the patent.” 76  Exactly what those “circumstances” were, 
however, was unclear until the seminal case of Egbert v. Lippmann.77 
The facts in Egbert are as follows: sometime between January and 
May of 1855, Ms. Egbert and a friend complained of the breaking of 
their corset steels.78 Mr. Barnes, “an intimate friend” of Ms. Egbert, 
offered to make a pair that would not break and presented his new 
design at their next rendezvous.79 Ms. Egbert used the redesigned 
steels for many years, placing them in new corsets as the old wore 
out.80 In 1863, now married to one another, Mr. Barnes had his wife 
cut open a corset and display the steels to another person, Mr. 
Sturgis. 81  Three years later Mr. Barnes obtained a patent on his 
design.82 Even though the corset steels were concealed within the 
corset, a very private device itself, over the dissent of Justice 
Miller,83 the Court held that Ms. Egbert’s use was a public use within 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See supra note 71. 
 75. Consol. Fruit Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 94 (1876). 
 76. Id. at 94. Mason completed the invention, an improved fruit jar and cover, in 1859 and applied 
for a patent in 1868. Id. at 93. In June 1859, Mason had a glassmaker make at least two-dozen jars for 
him. Id. He sold some of these in order “to get the money which they yielded, and to test their salability 
in the market.” Id. at 94. The Court held the statutory bar applicable; two years of continuous use or sale 
was not required. Id. The Court also noted that inventors are “a meritorious class” but must “comply 
with the conditions prescribed by law.” Id. at 96. 
 77. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 (1881). 
 78. Id. at 335. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 337. 
 83. Egbert, 104 U.S. at 338–39 (Miller, J., dissenting). Justice Miller argued in dissent: 
A private use with consent, which could lead to no copy or reproduction of the machine, 
which taught the nature of the invention to no one but the party to whom such consent 
was given, which left the public at large as ignorant of this as it was before the author’s 
discovery, was no abandonment to the public, and did not defeat his claim for a patent. If 
the little steep [sic] spring inserted in a single pair of corsets, and used by only one 
woman, covered by her outer-clothing, and in a position always withheld from public 
observation, is a public use of that piece of steel, I am at a loss to know the line between a 
private and a public use. 
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the meaning of the statute.84 The Court reasoned that Barnes gave the 
steels to Ms. Egbert without any obligation of secrecy or for any 
purpose of experiment and she might have exhibited them to any 
person she pleased, or might have made other steels of the same kind, 
and used or sold them without violation of any condition or 
restriction imposed on her by the inventor. 85  The invention was 
complete at the time Mr. Barnes gave Ms. Egbert the steels and he 
“slept on his rights for eleven years.” 86  The Supreme Court 
reinforced this holding two times in as many years following 
Egbert.87 
                                                                                                                 
Id. at 339 (Miller, J., dissenting). 
 84. Id. at 337. The Court reasoned: 
[T]o constitute the public use of [a patent] it is not necessary that more than one of the 
patented articles should be publicly used. The use of a great number may tend to 
strengthen the proof, but one well-defined case of such use is just as effectual to annul the 
patent as many. . . . We remark, secondly, that, whether the use of an invention is public 
or private does not necessarily depend upon the number of persons to whom its use is 
known. If an inventor, having made his device, gives or sells it to another, to be used by 
the donee or vendee, without limitation or restriction, or injunction of secrecy, and it is so 
used, such use is public, even though the use and knowledge of the use may be confined 
to one person. We say, thirdly, that some inventions are by their very character only 
capable of being used where they cannot be seen or observed by the public eye. An 
invention may consist of a lever or spring, hidden in the running gear of a watch . . . . 
Nevertheless, if its inventor sells a machine of which his invention forms a part, and 
allows it to be used without restriction of any kind, the use is a public one. So, on the 
other hand, a use necessarily open to public view, if made in good faith solely to test the 
qualities of the invention, and for the purpose of experiment, is not a public use within 
the meaning of the statute. 
Id. at 336. 
 85. Id. at 337. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Manning v. Cape Ann Isinglass & Glue Co., 108 U.S. 462 (1883) (holding patent on a 
method of converting fish bladders made of gelatin, isinglass, into thin hard sheets was invalid). The 
Court found that a succession of partnerships used substantially the same process more than four years 
before the application date. Id. at 464. The public use bar applied because the patent owner’s partners 
“were allowed by the inventor the unrestricted use of the [patented method] during the period 
mentioned, without injunction of secrecy or other condition.” Id. at 465 (citing Egbert, 104 U.S. at 333). 
In the second case, the Court held a patent on an improvement to the doors and casing of safes was 
invalid. Hall v. Macneale, 107 U.S. 90 (1883). More than two years prior to filing his patent application, 
the inventor sold three of the “burglar-proof” safes. Id. at 96. Even though completely concealed within 
the safe, the Court found the invention was in public use. Id. at 96. 
The construction and arrangement and purpose and mode of operation and use of the 
bolts in the safes were necessarily known to the workmen who put them in. They were, it 
is true, hidden from view, after the safes were completed, and it required a destruction of 
the safe to bring them into view. But this was no concealment of them or use of them in 
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Though Egbert is widely followed in the federal courts, 88  the 
Federal Circuit has occasionally distinguished similar fact patterns by 
implying confidentiality in the absence of an express agreement of 
confidentiality. 89  In one such case, Moleculon Research Corp. v. 
CBS, Inc., the owner of a patent on a cube puzzle composed of eight 
smaller cubelets that could be rotated in groups, sued CBS for 
infringement via its Rubik’s Cube puzzle.90 More than a year before 
he applied for the patent, the inventor, Larry Nichols, constructed 
several paper models of his puzzle, which confirmed the feasibility of 
his conception.91 Nichols showed these puzzles to several friends, 
including two roommates and a colleague in the chemistry 
department, and explained the puzzle to at least one of them.92 In 
addition, Nichols brought a working wood block prototype of his 
puzzle into his office and demonstrated how it worked to 
Moleculon’s president, who expressed immediate interest and 
suggested that Nichols commercialize the cubed puzzle.93 The court 
declined to follow Egbert, instead finding that “Nichols at all times 
retained control over the puzzle’s use and the distribution of 
information concerning it,” despite the fact that neither Nichols’s 
                                                                                                                 
secret. They had no more concealment than was inseparable from any legitimate use of 
them. 
Id. at 97 (citing Egbert, 104 U.S. at 333). Because the safes seemed clearly to have been “on sale” and 
in fact sold, it is not clear why the Court decided to discuss the problems in terms of public use. 2-6 
CHISUM, supra note 71, at § 6.02(2)(f). 
 88. E.g., Manning, 108 U.S. 462; Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 89. See, e.g., Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1986); cf. TP Labs., 
Inc., v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In TP Laboratories, the inventor, more 
than a year before filing his patent application for an orthodontic device, used the device on three 
different patients without obligation of confidentiality or secrecy. TP Labs., Inc., 724 F.2d at 967–68. In 
addition, several of the inventor’s associates saw the device before the critical date. Id. at 969. The court 
held this pre-filing activity did not constitute a § 102(b) public use because, contrary to the district 
court’s findings of fact, the pre-filing uses were experimental. Id. at 972. Moreover, that other 
orthodontists saw the device in the patients’ mouths “does not indicate the inventor’s lack of control or 
abandonment to the public.” Id. The court reasoned that the public use bar was inapplicable because 
“none of the policies which underlie the public use bar and which, in effect, define it have been shown 
to be violated.” Id. at 973. 
 90. Moleculon, 793 F.2d at 1263. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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friends nor Moleculon’s president had not entered into any express 
confidentiality agreement.94 Thus, the court held the public use bar 
did not apply to the invention.95 
D.   The Public Use Statutory Bar and Secret Commercial Use 
In addition to a single use by someone other than the inventor not 
obligated to secrecy or confidentiality, courts apply the public use bar 
when an inventor uses the invention for commercial purposes more 
than a year prior to filing for a patent, even if the use is absolutely 
secret. 96  This situation differs greatly from Pennock and Egbert 
because, unlike in those cases, only the inventor, or a small number 
of people restricted by confidentiality, use or know of the invention.97 
In other words, the prior patent-invalidating uses are secret, 
completely concealed from the public. Without a doubt, however, 
this doctrine furthers the channeling and prompt disclosure rationales 
by preventing inventors from secretly using their inventions and 
waiting to patent the invention until a subsequent inventor enters the 
market. 
The secret-commercial-user doctrine took root in a 1946 decision 
by the oft-quoted Judge Learned Hand.98 In Metallizing Engineering 
Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., Judge Hand ruled that if an 
inventor uses his invention for commercial purposes for more than 
one year, he “forfeits his right [to a patent] regardless of how little 
the public may have learned about the invention.”99 Relying on the 
channeling and prompt disclosure rationales expressed in Pennock, 
the court invalidated the patent due to the inventor’s secret use of an 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Id. at 1266. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See, e.g., Hall v. Macneale, 107 U.S. 90, 96 (1883). 
 97. Compare id., with Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829), and Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 
333 (1881). 
 98. Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. 
denied, 328 U.S. 840 (1946). 
 99. Id. at 519–20. This decision overruled Peerless Roll Leaf Co. v. Griffin & Sons, holding that the 
predominantly commercial character of the inventor’s secret uses would not invalidate his patent, even 
though the uses were more than one year before the critical date. Id. at 518; see also Peerless Roll Leaf 
Co. v. Griffin & Sons, 29 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1928). 
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improved process for conditioning metal for his clients. 100  The 
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have since explicitly adopted the 
seminal decision by Judge Hand.101 
Interestingly, Judge Hand’s decision in Metallizing did not 
overrule Gillman v. Stern (also written by Judge Hand), where the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a third party’s prior 
secret commercial use of a new machine more than a year before the 
critical date did not prevent the inventor of the machine from 
patenting the device later. 102  The court ruled that a prior use, 
commercial or otherwise, which did not disclose the invention to the 
art was not within the statutory bar.103 As with Judge Hand’s first 
party secret commercial use cases, the Supreme Court and Federal 
Circuit have explicitly adopted this aspect of his decisions as well.104 
In doing so, the Federal Circuit noted that “[t]here is no reason or 
statutory basis” on which a secret commercial use by an independent 
non-applicant more than a year before the critical date could bar a 
patent.105 
                                                                                                                 
 100. See Metallizing, 153 F.2d at 520. 
 101. E.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 149 (1989) (“As Judge 
Learned Hand once put it: ‘[I]t is a condition upon the inventor’s right to a patent that he shall not 
exploit his discovery competitively after it is ready for patenting; he must content himself with either 
secrecy or legal monopoly’”) (quoting Metallizing, 153 F.2d at 520); D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics 
Corp., 714 F.2d 1144, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Federal Circuit states that “an inventor’s own prior 
commercial use, albeit kept secret, may constitute a public use or sale under § 102(b), barring him from 
obtaining a patent.” Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 102. Gillman v. Stern, 114 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1940). I want to reiterate the distinction between 
secret use and hidden public use. In Egbert, Ms. Egbert’s use of the corset steels was a public use 
notwithstanding the hidden nature of the use because she was not under an obligation of secrecy to 
Barnes (the inventor). Egbert, 104 U.S. at 337. In contrast, a secret use is one in which only the inventor 
(or those under obligation of secrecy or confidentiality) uses or has access to the invention. If Barnes 
asked Ms. Egbert to sign a confidentiality agreement before seeing or using the new corset steels, then it 
would be a secret use. Whether such a use would be considered “commercial” within the meaning of the 
Metallizing forfeiture doctrine is a different question. 
 103. Gillman, 114 F.2d at 31. 
 104. E.g., Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing Metallizing, 153 
F.2d at 516; D.L. Auld Co., 714 F.2d at 1144; W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540 
(Fed. Cir. 1983)); D.L. Auld, 714 F.2d at 1147. 
 105. W.L. Gore, 721 F.2d at 1550. 
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E.   Introducing the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
In 2011, following years of scholarly and congressional debate, 
Congress enacted the AIA and comprehensively reformed the 
American patent system.106 The major change was from a first-to-
invent (FTI) system to a first-inventor-to-file (FITF) system, 
“harmoniz[ing] the United States patent system with the patent 
systems commonly used in nearly all other countries throughout the 
world with whom the United States conducts trade.”107 The switch to 
a FITF system means that the first person to invent a new technology 
or improve upon an existing technology no longer holds the exclusive 
right to patent his or her invention. Instead, it is a race to file the 
patent application.108 Unlike under the former statutory regime, an 
earlier inventor who does not abandon his invention or sleep on his 
right to patent will not get a patent on the invention if a subsequent 
inventor applies for a patent first.109 In fact, under the AIA, the later-
inventor/earlier-filer has the right to exclude the first inventor from 
making, using, and selling the technology. 110  Many patent law 
scholars criticize this approach because they think it benefits big 
companies and hurts small companies and independent inventors.111 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284 (2011); 
Taskalos, supra note 56 (examining several patent reform proposals leading up to the AIA). 
 107. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(p), 125 Stat. 284 (2011). The AIA 
essentially established a first-inventor-to-publish system rather than a first-inventor-to-file system 
because of the one-year grace period. See discussion infra note 117 (explaining the effect of the grace 
period under the AIA). 
 108. See id. (establishing a race to publish the subject matter of the invention). 
 109. See Taskalos, supra note 56 at 679–700. 
 110. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012) (granting a patent-holder the right to exclude others from making, 
using, and selling the patented technology in the United States). But see 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012) 
(creating a limited defense for inventors who commercially used the patented technology at least one 
year before the effective filing date or date on which the claimed invention was disclosed publicly); 
Martin Gomez, Note, Manufacturing, Please Come Home: How AIA’s Prior User Right Could Be The 
American Economy’s Savior, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 61, 74–78 (2012). 
 111. See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, The Need for Speed (and Grace): Issues in a First-Inventor-to-File 
World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1035, 1041 (2008) (arguing that a move by the United States to a first 
to file system will likely have negative ramifications for small entity inventors); Ned L. Conley, First-
to-Invent: A Superior System for the United States, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 779, 782 (1991). But see Mark 
A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 
1299, 1320–21 (2003) (arguing that the U.S. first to invent system is not helping small entity inventors). 
See generally Dennis D. Crouch, Is Novelty Obsolete? Chronicling the Irrelevance of the Invention Date 
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The AIA also introduced three important changes to the scope and 
content of the prior art in U.S. patent law.112 First, the AIA amended 
the statutory language that defines the events that qualify as prior art. 
The text of the new patent statute provides: 
Conditions for patentability [and] novelty 
(a) Novelty; Prior Art.—A person shall be entitled to a patent 
unless— 
(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed 
publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available 
to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention.113 
The new statute removes the old § 102(a) “previously known or 
used by others” category of prior art and adds a new catch-all 
provision with the “or otherwise available to the public” language.114 
Second, the AIA removes the old, one-year, automatic grace 
period.115 The AIA’s new grace period only covers disclosures by the 
inventor made within a year of the effective application date116 or 
disclosures by anyone else occurring after the inventor publicly 
disclosed the invention but within a year of the effective application 
date.117 Last, the AIA removed the geographic restrictions previously 
                                                                                                                 
in U.S. Patent Law, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 53, 59 n.20 (collecting sources on the 
advantages and disadvantages of adopting a first-to-file system). 
 112. Gomez, supra note 110. The AIA also made several other changes not described in this article. 
For example, the AIA added a post-grant review option to quickly weed out mistake patents. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 321 (2012). The post-grant review allows anyone to challenge the validity of a patent based on §§ 101, 
102, 103, and 112. Id. at § 321(b). A challenger must file within nine months of the issuance of the 
patent. Id. at § 321(c). 
 113. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 114. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012), with 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 115. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012). 
 116. Id. The effective application date or effective filing date found in § 102(a) is the earliest date of 
the following: (1) the actual filing date of the patent per § 100(i)(1); (2) the filing date of the first foreign 
application to which a later U.S. application establishes priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119; (3) the filing 
date of the first U.S. application to which a later U.S. continuation application establishes priority under 
35 U.S.C. § 120; or (4) the filing date of the first U.S. application to which a later U.S. continuation 
application establishes priority under 35 U.S.C. § 121. Id. A single patent application may have multiple 
claims with different effective filing dates based on when a sufficient disclosure was made. Id. 
 117. Id. § 102(b)(1). Under the AIA, it is ambiguous whether a third party patent application filed, 
which claims the same invention in a previous public disclosure by the later patent applicant, qualifies 
as prior art. Id. The majority believes that the AIA’s grace period means that the AIA really is a first-
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placed on the public use and “on sale” statutory bars.118 Under the 
AIA, if the invention is “in public use, on sale, or otherwise available 
to the public” anywhere in the world, the invention is not 
patentable.119 
How courts will interpret this new prior art definition “in public 
use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public” is unclear.120 Many 
scholars argue that retention of the terms “public use” and “on sale” 
indicate a congressional desire to adopt the previous judicial 
interpretation of those terms.121 However, the textual amendments to 
§ 102(b) prior art inject a “publicness” requirement into patent-
invalidating prior art events under the AIA.122 Retaining the judicial 
interpretation of public use would render the phrase “otherwise 
available to the public” superfluous and maintain the internationally 
disharmonious patentability standard, which is contrary to the spirit 
of the patent reform. Further, and more importantly, with the removal 
of geographic restrictions and removal of the automatic grace period, 
it is critical that hidden third party activity not create bars to U.S. 
patentability. Such a burden would create a wildly unpredictable 
patent system, and inventors and investors may lose faith in 
American patent protection. 
                                                                                                                 
inventor-to-disclose system and a subsequently filed patent application does not bar the person who first 
disclosed the invention from claiming it in his own later-filed patent application. 
 118. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) (2012). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 121. See infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 122. See infra notes 139–138 and accompanying text. 
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II.   DEFINING PUBLIC USE IN A POST-AIA WORLD 
A.   Statutory Interpretation Reveals that Public Use No Longer 
Includes Hidden, Inaccessible, Private Use 
1.   The Text of AIA § 102(a)(1) 
When interpreting a statute, the natural staring point is the text.123 
If the meaning is plain and unambiguous, courts apply the statute 
according to its terms.124 For primarily two reasons, the text of AIA 
§ 102(a)(1) plainly indicates that prior art no longer includes hidden, 
inaccessible, private uses of technology,125 even if the use takes place 
before a disclosure by the inventor or more than a year before the 
effective application date. First, this category of prior art is called 
public use. Public means “exposed to general view” or “accessible to 
or shared by all members of the community.”126 One cannot seriously 
contend that the pre-AIA definition for public use—a single use by 
anyone under no limitation, restriction or obligation of secrecy—fits 
within the plain meaning of the term “public use.”127 For example, a 
drill bit is not “exposed to general view” or “accessible to or shared 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009) (“[Under the] settled principles of statutory 
construction . . . we must first determine whether the statutory text is plain and unambiguous.”) (citing 
United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4 (1997)); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) 
(“It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in 
which the act is framed, and if that is plain . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to 
its terms.”). 
 124. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 387. 
 125. See infra Part I.D. The meaning of the terms “hidden” and “inaccessible” are developed in Part 
0I.D. The terms essentially mean that a person of ordinary skill in the field of art could not locate the 
reference with reasonable diligence. Infra Part I.D.; MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 
925 (11th ed. 2003), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/private. The term “private” means 
non-public, in the sense that the action or event did not take place at a public forum (e.g. the event 
occurred in a laboratory or an apartment). Id. 
 126. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1005 (11th ed. 2003), http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/public. 
 127. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 339 (1881) (Miller, J., dissenting) (“I cannot on such 
reasoning as this eliminate from the statute the word public, and disregard its obvious importance in 
connection with the remainder of the act, for the purpose of defeating a patent otherwise meritorious.”); 
Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its Implications for Patenting, 40 
AIPLA Q.J. 1, 54–55 (arguing that it would be “truly absurd” to interpret § 102(a)(1) public use to 
include non-public uses). 
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by all members of the community” when it is used by one 
construction worker underground next to a highway.128 But that is the 
result under the pre-AIA definition of public use.129 Thirteen months 
before David Cox applied for his patent on that drill bit—merely one 
month before the critical date—one person other than Cox knew 
about the drill bit and tested it for Cox at a commercial site, hundreds 
of feet beneath the earth’s surface.130 The fact that others could have 
known about or discovered that use of the drill bit does not mean that 
others did have access to it.131 The statutory term is not “use that 
could have become public” but rather actually was “in public use.”132 
Second, the terms “public use,” “on sale,” and “otherwise available 
to the public” are linked together with “or.”133 When the term “or 
otherwise” appears at the end of a string of clauses, the term restricts 
the meaning of the preceding terms.134 Thus, the catchall phrase “or 
otherwise available to the public” gives meaning to the term “public 
use.”135 In effect, the AIA provides that if an invention is not publicly 
used it may still qualify as prior art—and destroy novelty—if it is 
available to the public in a different way. The key is that, to qualify 
as prior art, the AIA requires that an event or action is available to 
the public, through use or otherwise.136 A single use of technology in 
private by someone other than the patentee cannot qualify as being 
“available to the public” and, accordingly, the plain meaning of 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Cf. New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. at 1299. 
 130. Id. at 1293. 
 131. Id. at 1300. 
 132. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012). 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Strom v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 202 F.3d 138, 146–47 (2d Cir. 1999). In construing the 
term “may include . . . back pay, . . . or any other equitable relief,” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) 
(emphasis in original)) the court concluded that “the use of the words ‘other’ immediately after the 
reference to back pay and before ‘equitable relief’ demonstrated Congress’ understanding that the back 
pay remedy is equitable in nature.” Id. 
 135. 157 CONG. REC. S1370 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011). In open session before the Senate, Senator Jon 
Kyl explained that this was the proper construction of AIA § 102(a)(1). 157 CONG. REC. S1370 (daily 
ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (citing Strom, 202 F.3d at 146–47). Id. (citing Strom, 202 F.3d at 146–47). 
 136. 157 CONG. REC. S1366 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011). 
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public use in the AIA cannot include such a remote, hidden, 
inaccessible use.137 
Many patent attorneys and patent law associations agree with this 
interpretation of the AIA.138 For example, the Intellectual Property 
Law section of the American Bar Association writes: 
[T]he passage “otherwise available to the public” reflects the 
touchstone of what constitutes prior art under the AIA under 
section 102(a)(1). This section requires availability to the public 
or public accessibility is an overarching requirement. Such 
accessibility is critical to provide a simpler, more predictable and 
fully transparent patent system. As such, for a “public 
use” . . . .the statutory requirements under the AIA require a 
public disclosure. Thus . . . [non-public uses] would not qualify 
as prior art under the AIA.139 
The American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) also 
agrees.140 The AIPLA describes the AIA’s addition of the “otherwise 
available to the public” clause as “a major policy change achieved by 
the new legislation, which . . . further[s] the goal of increasing 
objectivity in the identification of prior art.”141 
Although it is clear that the AIA’s definition of public use does not 
include hidden, inaccessible, private uses, many argue that the text of 
                                                                                                                 
 137. See Armitage, supra note 127, at 53–55. 
 138. See, e.g., id. (arguing that the AIA § 102(a)(1) has an “overarching requirement for public 
availability in order . . . to constitute prior art” and that it would be “truly absurd” to interpret 
§ 102(a)(1) public use to include non-public uses); Dennis Crouch, Did the AIA Eliminate Secret Prior 
Art?, PATENTLYO (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/did-the-aia-eliminate-
secret-prior-art.html (describing views of patent attorneys and patent scholars on the meaning of 
§ 102(a)(1), including the Intellectual Property Owners Association and the American Bar Association’s 
IP Law Section). But see Mark Lemley, Comments on PTO 1st to File Guidelines, USPTO (July 26, 
2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/m-lemley_20121005.pdf (rejecting the 
USPTO’s interpretation of the AIA). 
 139. Joseph M. Potenza, ABA-IPL Comments on First Inventor to File Provisions (Oct. 11, 2012), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/aba-ipl_20121001.pdf. 
 140. See, e.g, William G. Barber, First Inventor to File Proposed Rules and Examination Guidelines 
(Oct. 5, 2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/aipla_20121005.pdf. 
 141. Id. at 8. 
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§ 102(a)(1) is ambiguous and advance their argument with various 
canons of statutory construction. Such an exercise is fruitless 
because, as Judge Richard Posner pointed out years ago, “for every 
canon one might bring to bear on a point there is an equal and 
opposite canon.”142 Indeed, in this instance, there are several canons 
favoring a new definition of public use in the AIA and several canons 
supporting retention of the old definition of public use. 
Scholars in favor of retaining the previous, overly broad definition 
of public use argue that the retention of the same pre-AIA language 
suggests that Congress intended the previous interpretation of those 
terms to be continued.143 This canon, however, rests on the false 
premise that a majority of legislators who voted on the reenactment 
actually knew of the courts’ interpretation of public use.144 It is more 
likely that only a small number of patent law specialists knew the 
courts’ broad definition,145 and thus this canon is unpersuasive. 
Others argue that Congress did not intend to change the definition 
of public use because Congress does not “‘hide elephants in 
mouseholes.’”146 They argue that changing the definition of public 
use would be a dramatic shift in U.S. patent law and that adding one 
clause to the list of prior art categories cannot have been designed to 
make such a dramatic change.147 This argument is also unpersuasive 
for two reasons. First, a new definition of public use is not a dramatic 
shift in patent law, so there is no “elephant” hiding in the 
                                                                                                                 
 142. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 276 (1985). 
 143. See, e.g., HAROLD C. WEGNER, THE 2011 PATENT LAW 110–12 (2d ed. 2011) (citing Professors 
Robert P. Merges and John F. Duffy in a September 16, 2011, PowerPoint). 
 144. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 800, 813–14 (1983). 
 145. See id. (arguing that only a small number of specialists in Congress know about judicial 
interpretations and desire to freeze the existing judicial construction into statutory form). 
 146. WEGNER, supra note 143 at 111–12 (citing Professors Robert P. Merges and John F. Duffy in a 
September 16, 2011, PowerPoint) (explaining that the court felt confident that the AIA did not 
“overrule[] Metallizing Engineering so that the inventor’s own secret commercial exploitation . . . will 
not bar that inventor from later seeking a patent [because] . . . Congress does not ‘hide elephants in 
mouseholes.’ Overturning two centuries of consistent law would be a big elephant to hide in a 
colloquy.”) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress, we have 
held, does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary 
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”)). 
 147. Cf. WEGNER, supra note 143. 
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“mousehole.” 148  Second, Congress could have unambiguously 
created a third catchall category and retained the old definition of 
public use, but it did not. For example, Congress could have simply 
not included the term “otherwise” in the last clause or the last clause 
could have been “or available to the public in any form.”149 
Lastly, critics of a newer, more common-sense meaning of public 
use argue that using a catchall phrase appearing at the end of a list to 
narrow the definition of the preceding terms violates the ejusdem 
generis canon of construction.150 According to the canon, the term 
“otherwise available to the public” is not intended to narrow the 
meaning of public use but is a catchall phrase whose breadth is 
narrowed by the preceding terms “public use” and “on sale.” 151 This 
argument lacks merit because the ejusdem generis canon does not 
apply to § 102(a)(1): the list is too short, and the “otherwise available 
to the public” term is not vague.152 Moreover, applying that principle 
in this setting violates the canon to avoid surplusage, which states 
that a statute should not be interpreted in a way that renders a term 
superfluous.153 If “otherwise available to the public” is constrained to 
                                                                                                                 
 148. WEGNER, supra note 143 (citing Professors Merges and Duffy). The “elephant” change in U.S. 
patent law to which these critics refer is the abrogation of the Metallizing doctrine. Id. However, that 
conclusion does not follow from the fact that the AIA adopted a new definition; that the AIA ushered in 
a new public availability requirement to public use does not mean that Congress overruled Metallizing. 
See infra Part II.A. (arguing that, despite a change in the scope of public use, the AIA did not overrule 
Metallizing); Taskalos, supra note 56 at 657 (arguing that the AIA did not overrule Metallizing). 
 149. However, it would be disingenuous to imply that Congress could not also have unambiguously 
removed hidden, inaccessible, private use from the prior art. That the AIA is ambiguous on this point 
may also suggest that Congress did not intend to do so. For example, Congress could have written “or 
otherwise available to the public” as “provided that the invention is made available to the public” or 
“unless the invention is not publicly disclosed.” In addition, Congress could have “inserted ‘non-secret’ 
before ‘ . . . public use, on sale . . . .’” Paul Morgan, The Ambiguity in Section 102(a)(1) of the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act, 2011 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 29, 33 (2011). 
 150. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the New Patent Act, 2011 
PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 12, 25–26 (2011). This canon of construction states that where “general words 
follow the enumeration of particular classes or persons or things, the general words shall be construed as 
applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or kind as there enumerated.” Walling v. 
Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co., 49 F. Supp. 846, 859 (W.D. La. 1943). 
 151. See Sarnoff, supra note 150. 
 152. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 153. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607–08 (2010) (citing Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 
(2009)) (interpreting § 273 such that business methods are never patentable “would violate the canon 
against interpreting any statutory provision in a manner that would render another provision 
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a category including public use and “on sale” events, there are no 
actions or events that would qualify as prior art under the “otherwise 
available to the public” category that would not also fall under the 
pre-AIA public use or “on sale” categories. 
2.   The Spirit of the AIA 
Even if the text of AIA § 102(a)(1) is ambiguous, the spirit of the 
2011 comprehensive patent reform reveals that public use no longer 
includes hidden, secret uses of an invention. When courts find the 
text of a statute is ambiguous or vague, they look to the purpose or 
“spirit” of the legislation.154  The spirit of the AIA reinforces the 
interpretation that public use does not include hidden, inaccessible 
uses of an invention because adopting the old definition would 
contradict two of its primary goals: international harmonization and 
increased efficiency. 155  The flagship reform of the AIA was the 
switch from a FTI system to a FITF system.156 The switch was made 
in an effort to increase efficiency and harmonize the US patent laws 
with the patent laws in the rest of the world.157 Employing a new 
public use definition under the AIA would further this policy because 
Europe and other major foreign countries—such as Japan—limit 
prior art to events that make an invention available to the public.158 
                                                                                                                 
superfluous.”). 
 154. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458–59 (1892) (straining the 
meaning of “labor or service of any kind” for “any person under contract” to exclude pastors and 
religious employees in favor of the “spirit” of the legislation). In fact, even if a court finds that the plain 
meaning of § 102(a)(1) adopted the old definition of public use, the court should ignore that plain 
meaning and follow the spirit of the AIA. 
 155. See discussion supra Part I.E. 
 156. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(p), 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 157. See discussion supra Part I.E. 
 158. European Patent Convention art. 54(2), Oct. 5, 1973, http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-
texts/html/epc/2013/e/index.html (defining prior art as “compris[ing] everything made available to the 
public by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other way” without geographic 
restriction); Japanese Patent Act art. 29(1)(i) (creating a bar to patentability where the invention was 
“publicly known in Japan or a foreign country”); Morgan, supra note 149, at 30 (arguing that excluding 
secret prior art would further the AIA’s purpose of international harmonization). See also WEGNER, 
supra note 143, at 106. 
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In addition, the AIA eliminated several categories of secret prior 
art, such as the § 102(g) secret invention by another inventor and the 
§ 102(f) prior knowledge transferred from another to the patent 
applicant categories. The removal of secret prior art leads to clearer 
notice for anyone interested in researching the state of the art159 and, 
in turn, increases overall efficiency by decreasing the volume of 
patent litigation.160 Likewise, courts should interpret § 102(a)(1) in a 
manner that eliminates secret prior art in an effort increase notice and 
efficiency. 
3.   The Legislative History of the AIA 
If the text is unconvincing and the spirit of the AIA does not 
persuade courts to eliminate hidden, inaccessible, private use from 
the public use prior art category, the legislative history behind the 
AIA forcefully supports the argument.161 Prior to the Senate vote, 
Senator Jon Kyl explained that the “[n]ew section 
102(a)(1) . . . limits all non-patent prior art to that which is available 
to the public.” 162  Senator Kyl explains that Congress’s Judiciary 
Committee added the words “otherwise available to the public” to 
                                                                                                                 
 159. See generally Crouch, supra note 138. 
 160. Most patent infringement suits do not involve willful infringement. 
 161. See Taskalos, supra note 5656, at 686–87. 
 162. 157 CONG. REC. S1370 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (emphasis added). The Senator stated that: 
Another aspect of the bill’s changes to current section 102 also merits special mention. 
New section 102(a)(1) makes two important changes to the definition of non-patent prior 
art. First, it lifts current law’s geographic limits on what uses, knowledge, or sales 
constitute prior art. And second, it limits all non-patent prior art to that which is available 
to the public. This latter change is clearly identified in Senate Report 110–259, the report 
for S. 1145, the predecessor to this bill in the 110th Congress. The words “otherwise 
available to the public” were added to section 102(a)(1) during that Congress’s Judiciary 
Committee mark up of the bill. The word “otherwise” makes clear that the preceding 
clauses describe things that are of the same quality or nature as the final clause—that is, 
although different categories of prior art are listed, all of them are limited to that which 
makes the invention “available to the public.” As the committee report notes at page 9, 
“the phrase ‘available to the public’ is added to clarify the broad scope of relevant prior 
art, as well as to emphasize the fact that it [i.e., the relevant prior art] must be publicly 
available.” In other words, as the report notes, “[p]rior art will be measured from the 
filing date of the application and will include all art that publicly exists prior to the filing 
date, other than disclosures by the inventor within one year of filing.” 
Id. 
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make clear that all of the relevant prior art “must be available to the 
public.” 163  Calling the current statutory bar doctrines “traps for 
unwary inventors [that] impose extreme results to no real 
purpose,” 164  the Senator explains that the present definition 
“abrogates the rule announced in Egbert v. Lippmann,” which held 
that the public use bar does not depend on the number of persons 
with knowledge of the use and that a single use may erect it.165 
In addition, during another Senate colloquy, Senator Leahy–the 
primary sponsor and author of the Senate bill—responded to 
questions about the meaning of § 102(a). He stated that: 
[S]ubsection 102(a) was drafted in part to do away with 
                                                                                                                 
 163. Id. (citing S. REP NO. 110–259 (2008)). Professor Sarnoff argues that the term “otherwise 
available to the public” only modifies the first two categories in § 102(a)(1) (patented and described in a 
printed publication), not “on-sale” and “public use.” Sarnoff, supra note 150 at 26. To support this 
conclusion, he argues that: 
The “otherwise available to the public” language derives from House bills in earlier 
Congresses. In those bills, the “on sale” and “in public use” categories had been 
eliminated in favor of a broad catchall category “otherwise publicly known,” which again 
suggested that [only] the first two categories (patented or described in a printed 
publication) also had to be publicly known. . . . This legislative language (including the 
definition) would have precluded most “secret prior art,” as pre-filing prior art was 
restricted to third-party sales or uses of the invention and as the earlier bills provided a 
one-year grace period for the inventor’s own acts. After significant off-the-record 
legislative negotiations, the existing “on-sale” and “public use” statutory categories were 
restored, and the “otherwise publicly known” language was converted to the “otherwise 
available to the public” language. 
Id. at 26 (citing H.R. 2795, 109th Cong., § 3(b) (2005) (proposed §§ 102(a)(1) and 102(b)(3)(A) & 
(B))). 
Harold C. Wegner also views the AIA’s revision history differently than Senator Kyl. Arguing in favor 
of retaining the pre-AIA definition of public use, he writes that: 
Perhaps [the] best argument [is] that the 2005 and succeeding versions of patent reform 
legislation until 2011 had included language that would have overruled Metallizing 
Engineering and that this language was consciously put into the earlier legislation for this 
purpose. . . . [A]lso . . . these changes were removed and replaced in the new law with the 
old “public use” language and without language disqualifying a secret commercialization. 
WEGNER, supra note 143, at 111 (emphasis in original). 
 164. 157 CONG. REC. S1371 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (citing as an example of such a result 
Beachcombers Int’l, Inc. v. Wildewood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1159–60 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
See infra text accompanying notes 194–198. 
 165. 157 CONG. REC. S1371 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (citing Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333, 336 
(1881)). Senator Kyl explains that in the AIA’s “revisions to section 102, vindication has finally come to 
Justice Miller, albeit 130 years late” and cites to Justice Miller’s dissent in Egbert. Id. (citing Egbert, 
104 U.S. at 339 (Miller, J., dissenting)). See also supra note 83. 
28
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss4/5
2015] PUTTING THE “PUBLIC” BACK IN “PUBLIC USE”  895 
precedent under current law that . . . private uses or secret 
processes practiced in the United States that result in a product 
or service that is then made public may be deemed patent-
defeating prior art. . . . In effect, the new paragraph 102(a)(1) 
imposes an overarching requirement for availability to the 
public, that is a public disclosure, which will limit paragraph 
102(a)(1) prior art to subject matter meeting the public 
accessibility standard that is well-settled in current law . . . .”166 
                                                                                                                 
 166. 157 CONG. REC. S1496–97 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2011). The senate colloquy is the following: 
Mr. LEAHY: Mr. President, Congress has been working on the America Invents Act 
going back many years. It has gone through numerous iterations and changes have been 
made over time. Accordingly, I want to take a few minutes to discuss some important 
legislative history of a critical piece of this bill—section 2 of the legislation, which 
amends section 102 of title 35 of the United States Code. There has been a great deal of 
attention paid to subsections 102(a) and (b) and how those two subsections will work 
together. Senator BENNET and others have asked about this issue in particular. 
Mr. HATCH: I thank the Senator. I agree with the chairman that it is important that we 
set down a definitive legislative history of those subsections, which will be important for 
each and every patent application. 
Mr. LEAHY: One key issue on which people have asked for clarification is the interplay 
between patent-defeating disclosures under subsection 102(a) and the situations where 
those disclosures are excepted and have no patent-defeating effect under the grace period 
provided in subsection 102(b). 
In particular, some in the small inventor community have been concerned that a 
disclosure by an inventor might qualify as patent-defeating prior art under subsection 
102(a) because, for example, the inventor’s public disclosure and by a “public disclosure” 
I mean one that results in the claimed invention being “described in a printed publication, 
or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public”—might in some situation 
not be excluded as prior art under section 102(b)’s grace period. There is absolutely no 
situation in which this could happen given the interplay between subsections 102(a) and 
102(b) as these subsections are drafted. 
We intend that if an inventor’s actions are such as to constitute prior art under 
subsection 102(a), then those actions necessarily trigger subsection 102(b)’s protections 
for the inventor and, what would otherwise have been section 102(a) prior art, would be 
excluded as prior art by the grace period provided by subsection 102(b). Indeed, as an 
example of this, subsection 102(b)(1)(A), as written, was deliberately couched in broader 
terms than subsection 102(a)(1). This means that any disclosure by the inventor 
whatsoever, whether or not in a form that resulted in the disclosure being available to the 
public, is wholly disregarded as prior art. A simple way of looking at new subsection 
102(a) is that no aspect of the protections under current law for inventors who disclose 
their inventions before filing is in any way changed. 
Mr. HATCH: [Response omitted.] 
Mr. LEAHY: . . . One of the implications of the point we are making is that subsection 
102(a) was drafted in part to do away with precedent under current law that private offers 
for sale or private uses or secret processes practiced in the United States that result in a 
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Thus, the legislative history evinces Congressional intent to 
remove hidden, inaccessible, non-public uses from the realm of 
patent-defeating prior art. 
B.   Hidden, Inaccessible, Private Use Creates a Different Kind of 
Problem 
All other arguments aside, it is critical that courts interpret public 
use such that it does not include hidden, inaccessible, private use to 
avoid a potentially disastrous problem. The patent cases that receive 
most of the attention are the cases mentioned above in Part II.A. 
Pennock,167 Egbert,168 and Metallizing.169 Those cases focus on the 
harmful conduct of the patentee, punishing or taking away the 
patentee’s right to receive patent protection for his or her invention. 
But the judicial interpretation of the public use statutory bar created 
an important problem: scrupulous inventors are blindsided by public 
use prior art that they did not know about and could not have known 
about. Although this problem is currently small in magnitude, it will 
grow much bigger in the next five or ten years due to the changes170 
in the AIA. 
If not prevented, the expansion of the problem of hidden, 
inaccessible, private prior art will cripple the US patent system. That 
conclusion may seem dramatic and exaggerated, but if patent 
practitioners and technology investors lose faith in the U.S. patent 
                                                                                                                 
product or service that is then made public may be deemed patent-defeating prior art. 
That will no longer be the case. In effect, the new paragraph 102(a)(1) imposes an 
overarching requirement for availability to the public, that is a public disclosure, which 
will limit paragraph 102(a)(1) prior art to subject matter meeting the public accessibility 
standard . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Harold C. Wegner describes this colloquy as “faux” “post-vote” legislative history and argues that the 
discussion took place the day after the AIA vote. See WEGNER, supra note 143, at 125–28. While a post-
vote explanation of the bill’s terms is certainly less persuasive than pre-vote Congressional debate, it 
clarifies the writer’s intentions and views of the clause’s meaning. In fact, Senator Leahy prefaces his 
comments by noting that other senators asked for clarification of subsection 102(a). 
 167. 27 U.S. 1 (1829). 
 168. 104 U.S. 333 (1881). 
 169. 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 170. See supra text accompanying notes 112–122 (describing the changes made by the AIA). 
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system’s ability to reward, they will discontinue seeking patent 
protection. In other words, hidden, inaccessible, private prior art may 
invalidate so many valuable patents that inventors and investors no 
longer seek patent protection because the risk of invalidity is so 
high.171 An infringement suit will be like digging one’s own grave 
because the defendant will seek out one person, anywhere in the 
world, who used the invention at least once outside of an obligation 
of secrecy. If the patent system is unpredictable due to high findings 
of invalidity, society will stop seeking patent protection. Instead, 
some inventors will keep their work secret and rely on trade secret 
protection. Other inventors will simply not invent because investors 
will not finance their innovations. Any combination of these two 
results will stifle innovation. A large percentage of inventions will 
never be made because they are ineligible for trade secret protection 
due to the problem of reverse engineering and independent 
creation.172 Even in the fields of art for which trade secret protection 
is effective, innovation will be stifled because the underlying 
                                                                                                                 
 171. The important metric here deals only with valuable patents. If the patent is not valuable, its 
validity is usually irrelevant because the patent-holder or exclusive licensee cannot profit from the 
patent. Litigation is a good barometer of a patent’s value. Without empirical evidence, it is impossible to 
know what percentage of USPTO-issued, valuable patents found invalid by courts would cause 
inventors and investors to lose faith in the U.S. patent system’s ability to reward inventors. It is fair to 
assume that if courts found ninety-five percent of valuable patents invalid it would stifle innovation. 
Likewise, it is fair to assume that if courts only found five percent of valuable patents invalid it would 
not stifle innovation. The decision to invent or not will also include many other factors, such as the field 
of art, the crowdedness of the type of invention, and the amount of the investment needed to develop a 
commercial product or implement a new process. Some fields of art, such as pharmaceuticals, are more 
predictable because they offer better notice and define boundaries better than other fields of art. BESSEN 
& MEURER, infra note 214. However, the breadth of the public use prior art category will affect the 
predictability of patent validity of pharmaceutical patents, at least to some extent. See, e.g., Dey, L.P. v. 
Sunovion Pharms., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that a clinical trial of a drug may 
have constituted public use under § 102(b) and remanding for factual findings). 
 172. See Kewanee v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 489–90 (1974). As the Court explained: 
Trade secret law provides far weaker protection in many respects than the patent law. 
While trade secret law does not forbid the discovery of the trade secret by fair and honest 
means, e.g., independent creation or reverse engineering, patent law operates “against the 
world,” forbidding any use of the invention for whatever purpose for a significant length 
of time. The holder of a trade secret also takes a substantial risk that the secret will be 
passed on to his competitors, by theft or by breach of a confidential relationship, in a 
manner not easily susceptible of discovery or proof. 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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technological advancement will remain undisclosed. Society loses the 
benefits of immediately understanding the technology through patent 
disclosure and of studying and improving upon the technology while 
the patent is enforceable.173 The secrecy of the invention may remain 
undisclosed for decades longer than a patent term.174 
The use of third party, independent public use prior art is different 
than the situation in Pennock. Although the uses that constituted 
public use in Pennock may have been uses by persons other than the 
patentee, the uses were not independent because they resulted from 
sales of hoses made via Pennock and Sellers’s patented process.175 In 
contrast, about sixty years later, the Supreme Court confirmed that 
third party, independent use can establish the public use statutory 
bar.176 In that case, however, the patent holder conceded that others 
had publicly used the claimed invention before the critical date. 
Although the argument would be frivolous today, the patent holder 
was arguing that public use by others, without the consent of the 
inventor, could not invalidate a patent.177 The argument presented in 
this paper is not that the AIA overruled that long-standing doctrine. 
Rather, this paper argues that, to further important patent law polices, 
AIA § 102(a)(1) public use prior art should not include independent, 
third party use that is hidden and inaccessible to the public. 
From 1993 to 2013, when determining the validity of USPTO-
issued patents, the Federal Circuit has considered third party, 
independent uses of a claimed invention under the § 102(b) public 
use prior art category at least twenty-four times.178 In at least eight of 
                                                                                                                 
 173. Although the patent holder contains the exclusive right to make, use, or sell the invention, others 
can use the information contained in the written description section to improve on the claimed invention 
or invent something different (non-infringing). Trade secret protection lacks the immediate benefit that 
patent disclosure provides to society. 
 174. For example, the Coca-Cola recipe has been a trade secret for over one hundred years. Coca-
Cola Moves ‘Secret Formula’ to New Vault in Atlanta, NY DAILY NEWS (Dec. 9, 2011 12:04 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/eats/coca-cola-moves-secret-formula-new-vault-atlanta-article-
1.989170. 
 175. See supra text accompanying notes 62–70. 
 176. Andrews v. Hovey, 123 U.S. 267, 273 (1887). 
 177. Interestingly, under the Patent Act of 1836, public use by others, without the consent of the 
inventor, could not invalidate a patent! Andrews, 123 U.S. at 271. 
 178. Dey, L.P. v. Sunovion Pharms., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2013); MySpace, Inc. v. 
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these cases, the third party use would not have qualified as patent-
defeating prior art if the definition of public use did not include 
hidden, inaccessible, private use. 179  For eight of the twenty-four 
cases, the outcome under a new public use definition was unclear, 
either because the factual record was insufficient to determine the 
outcome or because the alleged use was very close to what might be 
considered public, depending on the breadth of the new definition.180 
These cases primarily break down into three categories of third party 
public use: (1) patentee versus a corporate third party user;181 (2) 
                                                                                                                 
GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co., 655 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Orion IP, L.L.C. v. Hyundai Motor Am., 605 F.3d 967, 974 
(Fed. Cir. 2010); ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Clock Spring, 
L.P. v. Wrapmaster, Inc., 560 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky 
Med. Grp., Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1016–17 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. PDI Commc’n Sys., 
Inc., 522 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Adenta GmbH v. OrthoArm, Inc., 501 F.3d 1364, 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2007); Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Eolas Techs., 
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Emergency Fuel, LLC v. Penzoil-Quaker 
State Co., 71 F. App’x. 826, 833–34 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Lacks Indus., Inc. v. McKechnie Vehicle 
Components USA, Inc., 322 F.3d 1335, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. 
Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 292 F.3d 
728, 737 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000); Comfort Silkie Co. v. Seifert, No. 98-1476, 1999 WL 507166, at *1 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 
1999); Finnigan Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n., 180 F.3d 1354, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Baxter Int’l, Inc. 
v. COBE Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1996); In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1561–62 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994); Beachcombers v. Wildewood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1159–60 (Fed. Cir. 1994); 
Nat’l Research Dev. Corp. v. Varian Assocs., No. 93-1421, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 1493, at *5–*6 (Fed. 
Cir. Jan. 6, 1994); Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc., 5 F.3d 1557, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 179. Dey, 715 F.3d at 1353; Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1334; Emergency Fuel, 71 F. App’x. at 833–34; Juicy 
Whip, 292 F.3d at 737; Comfort Silkie, 1999 WL 507166, at *1; Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1057; Beachcombers, 
31 F.3d 1159–60; Nat’l Research, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 1493. 
 180. See ResQNet.com, 594 F.3d at 866; McKechnie, 322 F.3d at 1349; Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 
303 F.3d at 1306. See generally Star Scientific, 655 F.3d 1364; Clock Spring, 560 F.3d 1317; Adenta, 
501 F.3d 1364; Ormco, 463 F.3d 1299; Ultra-Tex, 204 F.3d 1360. 
 181. See, e.g., infra notes 184–192 (explaining the facts of Juicy Whip, 292 F.3d 728); Dey, 715 F.3d 
at 1356 (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment finding the patent claims invalid due to a 
lack of novelty because whether the failure of some of the individuals in a clinical trial to return the 
patented drug samples constitutes public use was a genuine issue of material fact); Ransomes v. Great 
Dane Power Equip., Inc., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6172, at *13–14 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 4, 2000) (considering 
a third party lawn mower control system to be prior art–presumably as public use before the critical 
date–and reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment finding the patent claim invalid because 
obviousness was a genuine issue of fact for the jury); Finnigan, 180 F.3d at 1357, 1367 (reversing 
commission’s finding of invalidity on the patent’s claimed “quadrupole ion trap” method because 
uncorroborated witness testimony of a hidden, inaccessible, private use occurred, which would have 
constituted public use, was insufficient as a matter of law to meet the clear and convincing evidence 
standard required to prove invalidity); Mendenhall, 5 F.3d at 1559, 1564. 
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patentee versus individual third party user; 182  and (3) laboratory 
sharing between colleagues.183 
1. Patentee Versus Corporate Third Party User 
A good example of this type of third party public use is in Juicy 
Whip v. Orange Bang.184 In Juicy Whip, the patentee claimed a post-
mix beverage dispenser that is designed to look like a pre-mix 
dispenser; essentially, the patent was for a vending machine that 
“stores beverage syrup concentrate and water in separate locations 
until the beverage is ready to be dispensed” with a “transparent bowl 
that is filled with a fluid that simulates the appearance of the 
dispensed beverage.”185 The court considered two separate beverage 
dispensers as prior art under § 102(b) public use.186 The first was a 
“makeshift” dispenser “converted [from] a pre-mix dispenser into a 
post-mix dispenser by removing the pre-mix nozzle, plugging the 
remaining hole, and installing a post-mix valve arrangement in the 
base of the pre-mix dispenser.”187 One customer used a makeshift 
dispenser for one month.188 The facts do not indicate how long the 
only other customer used this type of dispenser. The second was a 
“post-mix dispenser with a clear bowl placed on top of it.”189 The 
second design was used by one customer, for a total of about six 
weeks.190 Because of the broad definition of § 102(b) public use, the 
patent holder did not even argue on appeal that these did not qualify 
as prior art.191 Therefore, out of millions of vending machines in the 
                                                                                                                 
 182. Comfort Silkie, 1999 WL 507166, at *2 (affirming summary judgment finding patent claiming a 
special baby blanket invalid due to a lack of novelty because a single third party took similar blankets 
into public places); Beachcombers, 31 F.3d at 1156; see also Finnigan, 180 F.3d at 1357, 1359–60 
(explanation at supra note 181). 
 183. Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1334-35; Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1059; Nat’l Research, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 
1493, at *2–4. 
 184. See generally 292 F.3d 728 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 185. Id. at 731–32. 
 186. Id. at 734, 736–37. 
 187. Id. at 734–35. 
 188. Id. at 735. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Juicy Whip, 292 F.3d at 743. 
 191. Id. at 737. 
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United States, 192  three of them—designed to appear as pre-mix 
beverage dispensers to the public—practiced the same technology as 
claimed in the patent for a very short period of time and constituted a 
patent-defeating public use of the invention.193 
2. Patentee Versus Individual Third Party User 
Illustrative of the second type of third party public use is 
Beachcombers v. Wildewood Creative Products.194 In Beachcombers, 
the Federal Circuit upheld a jury verdict finding that a § 102(b) 
public use anticipated the patented liquid-filled kaleidoscope.195 The 
public use consisted of a display of a similar liquid-filled 
kaleidoscope device to about twenty-five guests at a house party, 
merely one month before the critical date.196 The court distinguished 
Moleculon,197 reasoning that the guests were under no obligation of 
secrecy and thus the social demonstration constituted a public use.198 
                                                                                                                 
 192. Olga Kharif, Technology: Vending Machines Get Smart to Accommodate the Cashless, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-08-29/vending-
machines-get-smart-to-accommodate-the-cashless (noting that there are currently five million vending 
machines in the U.S.). 
 193. See Juicy Whip, 292 F.3d at 735–36, 743. The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the district 
court and found the patent was valid because the oral testimony was insufficient to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the patent was invalid. Id. at 743. For purposes of this discussion, what matters 
most is that the Federal Circuit did not state that the alleged use did not qualify as public use; had 
Orange Bang documented the use better, Juicy Whip’s patent would be invalid. Id. 
 194. See generally 31 F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 195. Id. at 1160. Before reaching the public use issue, the court overturned the jury’s finding that the 
patent was invalid for indefiniteness. Id. at 1158–59. In finding the party display of a similar 
kaleidoscope constituted a public use, the court upheld the jury’s finding that claims 1, 6, and 11 were 
anticipated (and invalid) but upheld claims 8, 9, and 13 because the limitations in those dependent 
claims were not present in the kaleidoscope displayed at the party. Id. at 1160–63. This finding was to 
no avail, however, because defendant Wildewood’s kaleidoscope, which tracked the kaleidoscope 
displayed at the party, did not include those limitations and thus upheld the jury’s finding of no 
infringement. Id. at 1163. 
 196. Id. at 1159–60. 
 197. See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text (the “Rubik’s Cube” case) (finding that despite 
the lack of express confidentiality, the inventor maintained control over the cubical puzzle at all times 
when he showed the invention to several friends and his supervisor at work). 
 198. Beachcombers, 31 F.3d at 1160. Senate Minority Whip Jon Kyl cited Beachcombers as an 
example of how § 102(b) doctrines have become “traps for unwary inventors and impose extreme 
results to no real purpose.” 157 CONG. REC. S1371 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (citing Beachcombers, 31 
F.3d at 1159–60). 
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3.   Laboratory Sharing Between Colleagues 
In addition to the Eolas example, explained in the introduction,199 
another example of third party laboratory sharing between colleagues 
is Baxter International, Inc. v. Cobe Labratories, Inc.200 In Baxter, 
the Federal Circuit held that a patent for a sealless centrifuge used to 
separate blood into its components lacked novelty because it was in 
public use.201 The prior public use resulted from a sealless centrifuge 
built by two research scientists at the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) prior to the critical date.202 The court found that the use of the 
centrifuge in the NIH laboratory constituted a patent-invalidating 
public use because the third party inventor did not make any effort to 
keep his centrifuge a secret, “others at NIH came into his laboratory 
and observed the centrifuge in operation, including co-workers, who 
were under no duty to maintain it as confidential,” and NIH was a 
public building.203 
C.   Changes in the AIA Make This Problem Potentially Disastrous 
for US Patent Law 
Three changes to U.S. patent law made by the AIA intensify the 
problem of hidden third party public use and threaten to undermine 
the goal of promoting innovations in science and the useful arts. 
Because of these substantive changes to prior art, Robert Armitrage 
explains that to include third party hidden, inaccessible uses as public 
use would be “truly absurd.”204 First, due to the switch from FTI to 
FITF, the AIA eliminated the § 102(a) “known and used by others” 
category of prior art.205 Therefore, all of the former § 102(a) novelty 
cases will now be shoehorned into § 102(a)(1) public use prior art 
                                                                                                                 
 199. See supra Introduction; see supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text. 
 200. 88 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 201. Id. at 1056. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 1058–61. 
 204. Armitage, supra note 127, at 55. 
 205. Id. at 46–47. 
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under the AIA.206 This structural amendment increases the scope of 
the § 102(a)(1) public use category and increases magnitude of the 
hidden, inaccessible, private use problem.207 
The second, and most dramatic, change is that the AIA removed 
the geographic restrictions on § 102(b) public use and § 102(a) 
“known and used by others.”208  Before the AIA was enacted, in 
contrast to “patented” or “printed publication” prior art, the public 
use or “used by others” prior art event must have taken place in the 
United States.209 Therefore, if an inventor implemented an improved 
process in a Russian factory, if an inventor let one friend try his 
invention in a Malaysian apartment, or if in an inventor showed his 
invention to a single colleague in Japan, the activity could constitute 
§ 102(a)(1) public use if the AIA adopts the same pre-AIA definition. 
These types of foreign uses differ significantly from patents and 
printed publications in other countries because, unlike in the three 
examples, patent applications and printed publications share the new 
technology with the world (or at least make it accessible to the 
world). 
The last noteworthy change is that the AIA removed the 170-year-
old automatic grace period. 210  Under the AIA, there is no grace 
period for inventions unless and until the inventor makes a public 
disclosure of his invention.211 Therefore, any prior art activity that 
                                                                                                                 
 206. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006), with 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 207. See, e.g., Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(applying “known or used by others” category); Rosaire v. Baroid Sales Div., Nat’l Lead Co., 218 F.2d 
72, 73 (5th Cir. 1955) (applying “known or used by others” category). Now, they must qualify as prior 
art under the public use category instead of the “known or used by others” category. Compare 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a) (2006), with 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 208. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2006), with 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). See also Armitage, 
supra note 127, at 46–47, 51. 
 209. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 897, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986). This case is commonly thought of as 
obscure, but at least the thesis was catalogued and potentially accessible. Id. at 899. Imagine a case 
where the same information was orally conveyed to a colleague in a laboratory or displayed to a family 
member in a private residence. 
 210. See Armitage, supra note 127, at 67. 
 211. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
Exceptions [to First Inventor to File rule in section (a)]— 
(1) Disclosures made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention.—A disclosure made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of a claimed 
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qualifies as a public use and takes place before the effective 
application date or the inventor’s own public disclosure will 
invalidate the patent.212 Before the AIA, even if an inventor did not 
make any public disclosures or publish his invention, any public use 
activity occurring within the year preceding the effective application 
date could not serve as prior art to show a lack of novelty or 
nonobviousness.213 
These three changes radically increase the scope of the public use 
bar and thus dramatically more prior art events will fall under the 
new § 102(a)(1) public use patentability bar. The U.S. patent system 
is already in trouble because it provides poor notice.214 Patents fail to 
function as property in many fields of art.215 Notwithstanding the 
“patent failure” and the fact that one patent per year is invalidated by 
third party public use, inventors and investors have continued to rely 
on patent protection to reward them for their innovation.216 However, 
these inventors and investors will likely stop believing in the 
                                                                                                                 
invention shall not be prior art to the claimed invention under subsection (a)(1) if—(A) 
the disclosure was made by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the 
subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or (B) 
the subject matter disclosed had, before such disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the 
inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly 
or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor. (2) Disclosures appearing in 
applications and patents.—A disclosure shall not be prior art to a claimed invention under 
subsection (a)(2) if—(A) the subject matter disclosed was obtained directly or indirectly 
from the inventor or a joint inventor; (B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such 
subject matter was effectively filed under subsection (a)(2), been publicly disclosed by 
the inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed 
directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or (C) the subject matter 
disclosed and the claimed invention, not later than the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention, were owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to 
the same person. 
Id. 
 212. Armitage, supra note 127, at 67. 
 213. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
 214. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND 
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 147–64 (2008) (concluding that patents fail to function “as 
property” due to the lack of notice provided by the American patent system). The AIA makes the notice 
problem in the United States worse because the new global public use prior art imposes additional 
search and litigation costs. In contrast to the former system, defendants will now search for public use 
events in foreign countries such as Russia and Malaysia. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) (2012). 
 215. BESSEN, supra note 214 at 51–52. 
 216. See id. at 70–72, 92–93. 
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profitability of U.S. patents if courts retain the broad pre-AIA 
definition of public use.217 The expansion of the problem of hidden, 
inaccessible, private use will make patent validity highly 
unpredictable.218 The changes in the AIA will likely invalidate so 
many valuable patents that inventors and investors no longer seek 
patent protection. To save the U.S. patent system and promote 
American innovation, AIA § 102(a)(1) public use should not include 
hidden, inaccessible, private use. 
D.   Excluding Hidden, Inaccessible, Private Use from the Prior Art 
Furthers Important Patent Policies 
In addition, excluding hidden, inaccessible private use from the 
public use bar will further important patent policies. When 
determining whether to apply the public use bar, the Federal Circuit 
looks to whether application of the statutory bar will promote the 
underlying policies. 219  In fact, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly 
asserted that the policies underlying the public use bar, “in effect, 
define it.”220 Turning to the four policies underlying the public use 
statutory bar, excluding hidden, inaccessible public use advances the 
quid pro quo and prompt disclosure rationales and leaves the 
detrimental public reliance and channeling rationales unharmed. 
There is no concern about detrimental public reliance on the new 
innovation because, by definition, the public cannot possibly think 
something is in the public domain if the only use is hidden and 
inaccessible from members of society. In addition, independent, third 
party prior art has no effect on the channeling rationale because that 
                                                                                                                 
 217. Id. at 88. 
 218. Id. at 10. 
 219. See, e.g., Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 220. See, e.g., TP Labs., Inc., v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (The 
public use bar was inapplicable because “none of the policies which underlie the public use bar and 
which, in effect, define it have been shown to be violated.”); cf. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., 
Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quoting Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng’g Inc., 904 F.2d 
1571, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990)) (“‘[T]he policies or purposes underlying the on sale bar [of section 
102(b)], in effect, define it.’”). 
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rationale only applies to first party inventors who commercialize 
their invention.221 
Excluding inaccessible uses from the public use prior art category 
will advance the quid pro quo rationale because many inventions in 
public use, as defined in pre-AIA jurisprudence, are not 
commercially developed. The public use bar rests on the assumption 
that if an invention was in public use, then society receives the 
benefit of that invention through commercial development or 
otherwise.222 However, this assumption is often incorrect under the 
old definition of public use because if the public use is hidden or too 
obscure, then society is unaware of its existence.223 For example, in 
Egbert, had Mr. Barnes not told his friends about the new corset 
steels and not applied for a patent on them, the world would be 
unaware of the invention and women all over America would have 
continued to suffer from constantly breaking corset steels. 224  The 
patent-defeating public use—letting Ms. Egbert use the corset 
steels—shared no knowledge with the world.225 In addition, once an 
invention is in public use, the incentive of patent protection is 
removed from the equation, and there is often no economic incentive 
to develop or commercialize the technology.226 Raising the public use 
bar to exclude hidden, inaccessible uses increases the likelihood that 
a public use actually places the invention in the public domain and 
decreases the chance of a trivial use erecting the patentability bar. 
Rejecting the pre-AIA definition of public use furthers the prompt 
disclosure policy for two reasons. First, without good notice and 
predictability, persons with skill in the relevant fields of art may lose 
confidence in the patent system’s ability to financially reward the 
innovations. This concern will motivate inventors and businesses to 
keep their inventions secret and rely on trade secret protections rather 
                                                                                                                 
 221. See infra Part III.A (discussing the continued vitality of Metallizing). 
 222. See TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 970–72. 
 223. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 335 (1881). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 337. 
 226. See Kitch, supra note 13, at 266; Roin, supra note 50, at 503 (arguing that pharmaceutical drugs 
are not commercialized without the economic incentive of patent protection). 
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than risk disclosing their invention through a patent application. 
Excluding hidden, inaccessible prior art will increase predictability in 
the U.S. patent system and will foster trust and reliance in patent 
protection. Second, the first-inventor-to-file priority system and the 
removal of the automatic grace period already provide sufficient 
incentive to promptly disclose new technology. 227  Therefore, 
requiring public accessibility in § 102(a)(1) public use will promote 
the prompt public disclosure policy. 
E.   The Difference Between Hidden, Inaccessible, Private Use and 
Secret Use Is Insignificant 
The final reason why courts should discontinue the old pre-AIA 
definition of public use is because there is an insignificant difference 
between hidden, inaccessible public use and secret use. It is well-
established law that “when an asserted prior use is not that of the 
applicant, § 102(b) is not a bar when that prior use or knowledge is 
not available to the public.”228 The Federal Circuit, however, draws a 
very fine line between available to the public and secret use.229 This 
distinction is senseless and rests on hypothetical possibilities rather 
than reality.230 There is no material difference between an invention 
known by one person, other than the inventor, bound by secrecy and 
an invention known by one person, not bound by secrecy, who tells 
no one of the invention. The fact that the non-inventor with 
knowledge could have shared the innovative knowledge with the 
                                                                                                                 
 227. 157 CONG. REC. S1371 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 228. Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing W.L. 
Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983)) (reasoning that third party 
secret commercial activity, more than one year before the patent application of another, is not a § 102(b) 
bar); 1 IRVING KAYTON, PATENT PRACTICE § 4.41 (6th ed. 1995) (“Where the commercially 
advantageous, secret use is by a third party and even though that use is for a period more than one year 
before the applicant’s filing date, it cannot constitute a statutory time bar under § 102(b).”) (emphasis in 
original); Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. COBE Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1058–59 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (third party 
prior use accessible to the public is a § 102(b) bar)); see also Nat’l Research Dev. Corp. v. Varian 
Assocs., No. 93-1421, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 1493, *10 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 1994). 
 229. See Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 339 (1881) (Miller, J., dissenting) (“I am at a loss to 
know the line between a private and a public use.”). 
 230. Id. 
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whole world is logically unimportant; he or she did not tell the whole 
world, so the general public does not know of the invention. In 
reality, in neither case is the inventive knowledge available to the 
public. 
In determining whether a claimed invention is available to the 
public, the important questions should be how many people know 
about the invention and who knows about the invention. 231  The 
answer is the same in either case: one person other than the inventor 
knows about the invention. The important part should be whether the 
user actually told someone. 
III.   ISSUES RAISED BY A NEW INTERPRETATION OF PUBLIC USE 
Concluding that the AIA eliminates inaccessible, private, third 
party use from the public use prior art category does not end the 
judicial inquiry into the meaning of the AIA’s § 102. Rather, this 
departure from the formerly established definition of public use 
brings to light several interesting questions. For example, does the 
AIA eliminate the Metallizing doctrine and allow first party secret 
commercial use prior to filing a patent application? If public use does 
not include inaccessible, hidden, third party uses, what is the standard 
for determining public use under the AIA? What about private 
inventors and small business entities who invent the subject matter of 
a patent and use the invention but do not file for a patent—can the 
patentee exclude them from using their invention? Does the new 
definition of public use also apply to the on sale bar? The discussion 
below addresses these issues in turn. 
                                                                                                                 
 231. See New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(Dyk, J., dissenting) (arguing that the drill bits were not in public use because they were used 
underground at the worksite and only one-person not under an explicit duty of confidentiality actually 
knew of the drill bit). 
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A.   Metallizing and the Problem of First Party Secret Commercial 
Use 
Contrary to the widely held belief that a narrow interpretation of 
§ 102(a)(1) public use will overrule Metallizing, the Metallizing 
doctrine should survive notwithstanding the addition of the public 
availability requirement of public use.232 This surprising result occurs 
because Metallizing established a non-statutory forfeiture theory, 
separate from the public use statutory bar.233 Although the public use 
bar was well established at the time of the decision, Judge Hand did 
not invoke it but rather described it as a forfeiture.234 That the Federal 
Circuit has repeatedly noted that the secret commercial use bar only 
apples to the secret user, not anyone else, bolsters the argument that 
the restriction on patentability is not a public use statutory bar.235 
In addition, public policy, which effectively defines the public use 
bar, militates against allowing secret commercial users to patent their 
                                                                                                                 
 232. See Taskalos, supra note 56, at 701 (arguing that even applying a public accessibility standard 
does not clearly eliminate the Metallizing doctrine). 
 233. Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 234. Id. (“[I]n [a prior decision] we confused two separate doctrines: (1) The effect upon his right to a 
patent of the inventor’s competitive exploitation of his machine or of his process; (2) the contribution 
which a prior use by another person makes to the art. Both do indeed come within the phrase, ‘prior 
use’; but the first is a defence [sic] for quite different reasons from the second . . . . [I]t is a condition 
upon an inventor’s right to a patent that he shall not exploit his discovery competitively after it is ready 
for patenting; he must content himself with either secrecy, or legal monopoly.” (emphasis added) (citing 
Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 7 (1829))). Judge Hand continues: 
It is true that for the limited period of two years he was allowed to do so, possibly in 
order to give him time to prepare an application . . . . But if he goes beyond that period of 
probation, he forfeits his right regardless of how little the public may have learned about 
the invention. . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit calls the Metallizing ruling a “forfeiture theory.” D.L. Auld 
Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 714 F.2d 1144, 1147–48 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“The ‘forfeiture’ theory 
expressed in Metallizing parallels the statutory scheme of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), the intent of which is to 
preclude attempts by the inventor or his assignee to profit from commercial use of an invention for more 
than a year before an application for patent is filed.”). 
 235. D.L. Auld, 714 F.2d at 1147–48 (“If Auld produced an emblem by the method of the invention 
and offered that emblem for sale before the critical date, the right to a patent on the method must be 
declared forfeited.” (citing Metallizing, 153 F.2d at 520)); see also W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. 
Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing D.L. Auld and Metallizing) (referring to the 
one year commercial trade secret activities as a “forfeiture,” not as a public use bar, applicable only to 
the secret commercial users’ activities and holding that “[t]here is no reason or statutory basis” on which 
the “secret commercialization” by the other, non-applicant, party “could be held a bar.”); Kinzenbaw v. 
Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing Metallizing, 153 F.2d at 520). 
43
: Putting the "Public" Back in "Public Use" Interpreting the 2011 L
Published by Reading Room, 2015
910 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:4 
inventions.236 In Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed Judge Hand’s challenging rationale, stating that “‘[i]t is a 
condition upon an inventor’s right to a patent that he shall not exploit 
his discovery competitively after it is ready for patenting; he must 
content himself with either secrecy, or legal monopoly.’”237 Allowing 
secret commercial use would undermine the channeling rationale by 
allowing inventors to choose secrecy first and later rely on patent 
protection.238 In addition, overruling the Metallizing decision would 
violate the prompt disclosure policy.239 Before the AIA took effect, 
the nomenclature of this case law doctrine was irrelevant to its 
continued existence.240 With its continued existence at stake, courts 
should uphold the Metallizing doctrine as an equitable forfeiture of 
the right to patent an invention. 
B.   Prohibiting Small-Entity Inventors from Using Their Inventions 
One potential side effect of the proposed interpretation is that 
small entities would be prohibited from using inventions that they 
invented before the patent holder invented the claimed invention. In 
one sense, this result is unavoidable; what else would happen through 
a switch from a FTI system to a FITF system? However, this 
consequence will occur more frequently because the removal of 
hidden, inaccessible uses from the public use prior art category 
results in more valid patents. Arguably, this result is a good thing for 
all of the reasons articulated in Part II of this paper. 
However, many critics characterize this result as a harmful side 
effect of the AIA’s adoption of the first-inventor-to-file system.241 
These critics argue that small-business entities will suffer because 
                                                                                                                 
 236. Taskalos, supra note 106, at 706–08; see supra Part I.B (describing the four policies underlying 
the public use statutory bar). 
 237. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 68 (1998) (quoting Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon 
Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946)). 
 238. Morgan, supra note 149, at 31 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 31–32. 
 241. See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 111, at 1041; Ned L. Conley, First-to-Invent: A Superior System for 
the United States, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 779, 782 (1991). 
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they have fewer resources and will be slower to apply for a patent on 
new technologies. 242  Section 5 of the AIA already contains a 
provision guarding against this concern.243 Harmonizing with over a 
dozen industrialized nations,244 this protection for prior users creates 
a limited defense for inventors who commercially used the patented 
technology at least one year before the effective filing date or date on 
which the claimed invention was disclosed publicly.245 If this limited 
defense inadequately protects small entity inventors, there are a 
variety of alterations Congress can make to strengthen these rights.246 
C.   Interpreting the “On Sale” Statutory Bar Under the AIA 
The argument presented in Part II—that hidden, inaccessible use 
should not be prior art—applies with equal force in favor of 
eliminating private, inaccessible third party sales and third party 
secret sales. The concerns with removing all private sales from the on 
sale prior art category are similar to those concerns with overruling 
Metallizing; it is axiomatic that an on sale event is commercial in 
nature. Thus, even if the new § 102(a)(1) on sale prior includes a 
public accessibility requirement, the Metallizing doctrine would still 
create an equitable forfeiture for first party secret sales.247 
The “on sale” prior art category differs from the public use 
category in two respects. First, the on sale statutory bar does not 
contain the word “public”; § 102(a)(1) of the AIA does not bar 
inventions “on sale publicly” or “on public sale.” 248  Without the 
word “public” in the prior art category, one could argue that the 
                                                                                                                 
 242. See Bagley, supra note 111, at 1041 (arguing that a move by the United States to a first to file 
system will likely have negative ramifications for small entity inventors). 
 243. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 5, 125 Stat. 285 (2011). 
 244. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, REPORT ON THE PRIOR USER RIGHTS 
DEFENSE 10–13, available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/20120113-pur_report.pdf. 
 245. 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012); see also Gomez, supra note 110, at 65, 76, 80. 
 246. See USPTO, supra note 244, at 13 (listing a variety of prior user rights elements that can be 
changed). 
 247. See discussion supra Part III.A (arguing in favor of retaining the Metallizing doctrine as an 
equitable forfeiture). 
 248. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012). 
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public availability is not required for sales.249 Second, the on sale bar 
differs from the public use bar because, unlike secret uses of the 
claimed innovation, secret sales prevent both the seller (first party) 
and an independent third party from obtaining a patent.250 Thus, the 
on sale bar on secret sales is a true statutory bar in that it applies 
equally to all inventors. 251  Whether the definition of on sale in 
§ 102(a)(1) should retain its pre-AIA definition is a very close 
question and requires a more in-depth discussion. 
D.   If the AIA Excludes Hidden, Inaccessible, Private Use, What 
Constitutes Public Use? 
Concluding that hidden, inaccessible, private use does not comport 
with the policies behind the public use statutory bar leaves open the 
issue of how to define § 102(a)(1) public use. The issue of where to 
draw the line between private use and public use is difficult. The 
Federal Circuit states that “[i]n general, ‘[a]ccessibility goes to the 
issue of whether interested members of the relevant public could 
obtain the information if they wanted to.’”252 To honor the evident 
public availability requirement that the AIA adds to public use prior 
art category, courts should incorporate some sort of requirement that 
the general public could actually access knowledge of the use. Thus, 
courts should find that a use is public if “if it ‘has been disseminated 
or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and 
ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable 
diligence, can locate it and recognize and comprehend therefrom the 
essentials of the claimed invention without need of further research 
or experimentation.’”253 
                                                                                                                 
 249. This argument is contrary to the argument presented above that “otherwise available to the 
public” clause defines the terms that precede it. See supra text accompanying notes 134–135. It is 
curious however, why the term “public use” includes the word “public” and the “on sale” bar does not. 
 250. Morgan, supra note 149, at 32. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Constant 
v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 253. Id. (citing In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (C.C.P.A. 1981)). 
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CONCLUSION 
From 1993 to 2013, when determining the validity of USPTO-
issued patents, the Federal Circuit considered third party, 
independent uses of a claimed invention under the § 102(b) public 
use prior art category.254 Three changes made by the AIA–the switch 
to a first-inventor-to-file system, the removal of geographic 
restrictions on public use, and the removal of the automatic one-year 
grace period–increase the scope of the public use prior art category. 
Thus, dramatically more prior art events will fall under the new 
§ 102(a)(1) public use patentability bar. If not prevented, the problem 
of hidden, inaccessible, private “public use” will grow and 
potentially cripple the U.S. patent system. When patent practitioners 
and technology investors lose faith in U.S. patent system’s ability to 
reward, they will discontinue seeking patent protection. In other 
words, hidden, inaccessible, private prior art may invalidate so many 
valuable patents that inventors and investors no longer seek patent 
protection because the risk of invalidity is so high. To accomplish the 
constitutional goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts” § 102(a)(1) must include a public accessibility 
requirement.255 
In addition, statutory interpretation of AIA § 102(a)(1) militates 
that public use prior art events be publicly accessible. The text 
plainly indicates that public availability is a requirement to qualify as 
public use prior art. Furthermore, the legislative history and spirit of 
the AIA favor excluding hidden, inaccessible, uses from the public 
use prior art category. To save the U.S. patent system and spur 
innovation in America, AIA § 102(a)(1) public use cannot include 
hidden, inaccessible, private use. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 254. See supra note 178. 
 255. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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